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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis, I study the use of performance fees in Finnish mutual funds, their impact on the 
funds’ risk-adjusted return, risk and their theoretical value. Furthermore, utilizing simulation-
based methods, my objective is to calculate a theoretical value for the performance fee 
structures in Finnish mutual funds. Finally, I also study the different regulatory approaches to 
performance fees in select European countries and the disclosure of Finnish funds’ 
performance fees. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
My sample consists of 332 mutual funds registered in Finland and contains quarterly 
observations on each fund from March 2007 to December 2012. 40 of these funds utilize 
performance fees. The sample is free from survivorship bias. My analysis is primarily based 
on random effects panel regressions with a variety of risk and return variables as dependent 
variables and funds’ individual characteristics as explanatory variables. I also utilize Monte 
Carlo simulation and the Margrabe model to calculate the cost of the fee for each of the funds 
in the sample. 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Funds with performance fees offer better risk-adjusted returns. The introduction of a 
performance fee increases the funds’ ex post four-factor alpha by on average 83 basis points 
per quarter. The results hold also when using Sharpe ratio and the raw quarterly return as 
dependent variables. The use of performance fees does not increase funds’ volatility levels 
relative to funds without such fees. However, funds with performance fees exhibit higher 
tracking errors, implying that funds take more active risk compared to their counterparts.  
The theoretical value of the performance fee is on average 1.35% Furthermore, funds with 
performance fees, on average, offer significantly lower management and redemption fees than 
funds without such fee structures. The difference is 22 and 24 basis points p.a. for 
management and redemption fees, respectively. However, the extra cost associated with the 
performance fees makes these funds more expensive on an annual basis. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkin pro gradu-tutkielmassani tuottosidonnaisten palkkioiden käyttöä suomalaisissa 
sijoitusrahastoissa, niiden vaikutusta tuottoon ja riskiin. Lisäksi lasken palkkiorakenteiden 
teoreettisen arvon jokaisella kyseistä palkkiota käyttävälle suomalaiselle rahastolle. Lisäksi 
tutkin erilaisia regulatorisia lähestymistapoja tuottosidonnaisten palkkioiden suhteen sekä 
suomalaisten tuottosidonnaisten palkkioiden julkituontia. 
DATA JA METODOLOGIA 
Otokseni koostuu 332 Suomeen rekisteröidystä sijoitusrahastosta ja neljännesvuosittaisista 
havainnoista aikavälillä maaliskuusta 2007 joulukuuhun 2012. Otoksen rahastoista 40:ssä on 
tuottosidonnainen palkkio. Otos ei kärsi selviytymisvinoumasta. Analyysini perustuu 
satunnaisvaikutuspaneeliregressioon hyödyntäen useita erilaisia riski – ja tuottomuuttujia. 
Hyödynnän lisäksi Monte Carlo-simulaatiota sekä Margraben mallia tuottosidonnaisen 
palkkiorakenteen teoreettisen arvon määrittämiseen jokaiselle rahastolle otoksessani. 
TULOKSET 
Tuottosidonnaisia palkkioita käyttävät rahastot tarjoavat parempia riskikorjattuja tuottoja. 
Tuottosidonnaisen palkkion käyttö lisää ex post neljän muuttujan riskikorjattua tuottoa 83 
korkopistettä kvartaalissa. Tulokset ovat samanlaisia myös käytettäessä Sharpen suhdelukua 
sekä riskikorjaamatonta tuottoa riippuvana muuttujana. Tuottosidonnaiset palkkiot eivät lisää 
rahastojen absoluuttista riskiä volatiliteetillä mitattuna. Tuottosidonnaista palkkiota käyttävät 
rahastot kuitenkin ottavat enemmän riskiä seurantavirheellä mitattuna.  
Tuottosidonnaisen palkkion teoreettinen arvo on keskimäärin 1.35% p.a.. Lisäksi 
tuottosidonnaista palkkiota käyttävien rahastojen hallinnointi – ja lunastuspalkkio ovat 22 ja 
24 korkopistettä alhaisempia normaaleihin rahastoihin verrattuna. Kokonaiskustannuksiltaan 
tuottosidonnaista palkkiota käyttävät rahastot ovat kuitenkin normaaleja rahastoja kalliimpia. 
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1. Introduction 
“These funds [with performance fees] effectively charge a performance fee for 
winning the lottery. If they base the fee on a track record that depends as much on 
chance, you are paying for luck as much as skill.” – (Rick Di Mascio, former 
pension fund manager, Financial Times, July 22nd 2011) 
 “I believe there is no need for performance fees within open funds. If assets grow 
and the fund earns more as a result of good performance, then that is fair. But ways 
of stealing profits from investors should be phased out.” – (Sven Gielod, Member of 
the European Parliament, Financial Times, November 18th 2012) 
Mutual funds charge their owners various fees, which have been under intense scrutiny in the 
past years both in academia and the financial press. The direct and indirect fees incurred by 
fund owners have a large impact on their net return. Furthermore, the justification for 
charging fees, especially performance fees, which are the focus of this thesis, is at time 
heavily contested. As evidenced by the quotes above, politicians and investment management 
professionals often have passionate opinions about performance fees and their fairness. 
In general, the relationship between investors and fund managers can be seen as a direct 
application of the traditional principal-agent relationship, in which the principal (the investor) 
gives control over her wealth to the agent (the fund manager). As is always the case with a 
principal-agent relationship, mutual funds suffer from an inherent conflict of interest due to 
the fact that the interests of the parties in the relationship are not aligned. In mutual funds, the 
agent (fund management) has a different incentive compared to the principal (fund investors). 
Simplistically, the fund management strives to maximize the value of their own income, 
which primarily consists of fees charged from the investors, whereas the fund holders simply 
want to maximize the return on their investment at a certain level of risk tolerance. 
One special type of funds’ fees is a fee type called the performance fee, in which the fund 
management gets a certain portion of returns exceeding the return of a preset benchmark. In 
principle, this type of incentive structure ought to reduce the aforementioned conflicts of 
interest between fund management and investors, as the performance fee gives the 
management an explicit incentive to maximize fund returns. However, as I elaborate later on, 
this incentivization to maximize returns may lead to undesired consequences such as excess 
risk-taking.  
In this thesis, I study the use of performance fees in Finnish mutual funds, their impact on the 
risk and return of the funds and their theoretical value to the fund management. The existing 
research on the topic has been scarce most likely due to the fact that in 1970 an amendment to 
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the Investment Company Act, the United States congress prevented mutual funds from 
charging asymmetric (i.e. fees, where the management shares the upside, but not the 
downside) performance fees (Thomas and Jaye, 2006). Only a few managers have been 
confident enough to charge so-called fulcrum (i.e. symmetric) performance fees, (Drago et al., 
2010), which decrease the management fee when the fund underperforms the benchmark. 
Naturally, to claim that fund managers solely maximize their own fees with no regard to fund 
performance is an oversimplification, as there are also other forces in play. The investors have 
a variety of means to discipline the fund managers, namely by voting with their feet and 
leaving the fund in case of poor performance. The flow-performance relationship in which 
mutual fund inflows and outflows directly follow fund performance has been widely 
documented in literature (see e.g. Berk and Green, 2002 and Huang et al., 2007) The flow-
performance relationship can thus be seen as an implicit incentive contract. The existence of 
this disciplinary mechanism implicitly incentivizes the fund management to operate at least 
partly in the interest of the investors, as otherwise investors will withdraw their investment, 
consequently reducing the fund management’s income from the fixed fees.  
Furthermore, as noted by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), the long-term career concerns of 
mutual fund managers also give the management an incentive to deliver returns to investors 
even without the existence of explicit contractual incentive mechanisms. Managers 
consistently squandering investors’ money can expect to see the number of investment 
management job opportunities diminish, especially considering the intense media scrutiny 
fund managers are subject to. 
However, despite the aforementioned caveats, performance fees’ impact on risk and return 
characteristics of specifically mutual funds provides a fascinating research topic, given their 
importance as investment vehicles for retail investors and openness and the relatively low 
amount of existing empirical research on the topic. Furthermore, contrary to the implicit 
incentives mentioned above, performance fees are an explicit, simple mechanism designed to 
achieve one thing: higher returns. Thus, the functionality of this incentive mechanism 
provides a fascinating area of study. 
The topic of performance fees is especially interesting, when one looks at the performance 
fees as an explicit option held by the management written by the investors. The theoretical 
value of the performance fee can be calculated by treating the fee as if the management has a 
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call option on a certain fraction (participation rate) of the spread between fund and benchmark 
returns multiplied by fund assets under management (Kritzman, 1987). Consequently, option 
valuation techniques such as extensions to the Black-Scholes-Merton model and numerical 
methods can be applied to attempt to estimate the monetary value of the option held by the 
management. 
Moreover, the option-valuation reasoning enables some simple empirical tests to see whether 
there are any implications of self-interested behaviour on the part of managers of funds with 
performance fees. For instance, the value of performance fees is positively related to the 
tracking error of the fund. Assuming that fund managers maximize the value of their fee 
income, we should, ceteris paribus, observe higher tracking errors for funds using 
performance fees, as higher tracking errors increase the value of the option (Elton et al., 
2003). 
1.1. Contribution to existing research 
My thesis contributes to existing research in a variety of ways. Firstly, even though the area of 
mutual fund returns and fees has been very extensively researched, the area of performance 
fees in mutual funds is not equally well known (For existing key research, see for example 
Elton et al., 2003; Golec, 1988 and Massa and Patgiri, 2009). One of the reasons for the 
relative lack of research on performance fees in mutual funds is the fact that due to the 
Investment Company Act of 1970, U.S. mutual funds have been prohibited from charging 
asymmetric incentive fees, which has effectively limited research on the topic to non-U.S. 
countries only.  
Consequently, finding out more about the relationship between performance fees and mutual 
fund returns and risk in a Finnish context is an intriguing question with practical significance 
to both retail investors and the academic world that is yet to be answered in previous research. 
In Finland, the share of holdings in funds with performance fees has steadily increased during 
the last decade from 2% in 2004 to 4.3% in 2008 with performance fee funds being favored 
by wealthier and more educated investors (Keloharju et al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, the spread option valuation approach to performance fees has, to the best of my 
knowledge, only been utilized done once in an unfinished working paper1 by Drago et al. 
(2005). Moreover, Kritzman (1987) utilized the Magrabe model (see Margrabe, 1978) to 
arrive at a monetary value for the performance fees in a simplistic setting. In the field of 
hedge funds, Goetzmann et al. (2003) provide some estimates for theoretical values for hedge 
fund incentive contracts. 
However, apart from studies mentioned above, there are, to the best of my knowledge, no 
other studies attempting to calculate a monetary value for performance fees for mutual funds. 
Thus, there is a clear gap in existing research which my study partly attempts to fill by 
calculating the ex ante value of the performance fee options utilizing Finnish data. The 
advantage of my approach, in which I calculate the theoretical value of the performance fee 
for each Finnish fund separately, is that it gives a tangible, generalizable estimate for the 
actual cost of performance fees in Finnish funds using actual return data, volatilities and 
correlations.  
In addition to filling the existing research gap on the value of performance fees and their 
relation to mutual funds’ return and risk, my research also has practical significance to retail 
investors. Mutual funds are one of the key investment vehicles available for use to retail 
investors. However, retail investors often lack the financial sophistication to be able to 
holistically evaluate and compare funds, especially involving mathematically complex and 
opaque components such as performance fees. Thus, researching performance fees in a 
mutual fund context adds value to the investment decision process for retail investors. 
1.2. Key research questions 
My study can be divided into three high-level categories. First, I test the impact of 
performance fees’ impact on fund risk and return empirically. Second, I calculate a theoretical 
value for the performance fees and compare the costs of funds with performance fees to funds 
without such structures. Thirdly, I provide some context for the regulation of performance 
fees by describing the regulatory approach to fees in select European countries. 
                                                 
1
 To be more exact, the final paper was published in Financial Management, but from a completely different 
perspective not including the performance fee valuation. I contacted Professor Navone to enquire about the 
matter and the reason the original paper was never published was related to the journal’s referees’ low interest in 
the value of the fees, as a consequence of which the focus of the paper was altered. Due to this reason, I often 
refer to the working paper version of the article instead of the finished, published article, which is of lower 
relevance to my research. 
  5 
Performance fees can be seen as a contractual mechanism that align interests of fund 
managers and investors more closely and incentivize the fund management to utilize their 
skills to provide higher returns. This argument leads me to my first research question: 
I. Research question: What is the impact of performance fees on fund returns in 
Finland? 
Following along with the option valuation approach, another question arises: as the ex ante 
value of a performance fee increases along with the volatility of the mutual fund and the 
tracking error, I would expect to observe higher active and absolute risk-levels for funds with 
performance fees. 
II. Research question: Do funds with performance fees on average exhibit more risk in 
terms of volatility, when adjusted for differences in investment styles? 
III. Research question: Do funds with performance fees exhibit on average higher 
tracking errors? 
Furthermore, from a contextual perspective, the costs of performance fees are not obvious to 
the layman and it is, from the retail investors’ point of view, an additional cost component. 
Thus, estimating an explicit theoretical value for the performance fee provides an interesting 
research question.  
IV. Research question: What is the cost of these performance fees as a percentage of fund 
AUM? 
A logical extension to the above question is whether funds with performance fees end up 
being cheaper, equally costly or more expensive to investors. Furthermore, if the performance 
fees are indeed an extra cost to the investors, it is interesting to see whether the investors are 
compensated for the extra cost.  
V. Research question: Do Finnish funds with performance fees charge lower other 
expenses compared to funds without extra fees? How do the total costs, including the 
calculated value of the performance fee, of funds with performance fees compare to 
funds without such fees? 
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Furthermore, the use and regulation of performance fees varies notably in Europe. In order to 
form a holistic picture on the regulatory drivers behind performance fees, I conduct some 
descriptive analysis on the different regulatory regimes with regards to performance fees and 
attempt to find out whether there are any differences across different countries. 
VI. Research question: How does the regulatory approach to performance fees differ in 
select European countries and the United States? 
1.3. Main findings 
My dataset consists of 332 Finnish mutual funds with quarterly observations from March 
2007 to December 2012. The dataset has been acquired via requests from Morningstar and 
Investment Research Finland, complemented by manual data gathering from individual fund 
prospectuses and rules.  
The key finding of my study is that the introduction of a contractual performance fees has a 
positive impact on a fund’s risk-adjusted return, even after controlling for time and 
investment style factors. The impact is 82 basis points per quarter on a fund’s four-factor 
alpha. The result is highly significant. The positive relationship between the use of 
performance fees and fund returns is observed also when using different dependent variables 
such as raw returns and the Sharpe ratio. 
The extra risk-adjusted return does not seem to be associated with additional volatility. When 
controlling for time effects and lagged volatility, the coefficient for the performance fee 
dummy is not significant. However, in terms of active risk, funds with performance fees do 
seem to take more active risk in terms of tracking error, which measures the standard 
deviation of the difference in returns of the fund and the benchmark. On average, funds with 
performance fees have tracking errors which are 4.09 percentage points higher than funds 
without performance fees. The difference is statistically significant, which implies that funds 
with performance fees have a tendency to take more active risk by deviating from the 
benchmark. This higher active risk can be achieved by taking positions in instruments either 
not included in the benchmark or by deviating from the weights of the benchmark in the asset 
allocation process. 
Furthermore, I calculate the theoretical value individually for each of the 40 funds using 
performance fees in my sample as of beginning of 2013.The theoretical value of performance 
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fees is on average 1.35% per annum of a fund’s assets under management at the beginning of 
the calculation period. The standard deviation for the value is 1.01%. The maximum 
performance fee in my sample is 4.84% whereas the lowest value is 0.01%. The estimated 
value is highly sensitive to changes in key parameters such as volatility and correlation.  
With regards to other fund fees, funds with performance fees offer lower management and 
redemption fees to their investors, while there is no significant difference in subscription fees. 
The discount to management and redemption fees is 22 and 24 basis points, respectively. 
Thus, funds with performance fees seem to offer discounts from other fees to compensate for 
the introduction of a performance fee. However, when including the calculated value of the 
performance fee into the picture, funds with performance fees do appear to be more expensive 
on a total cost basis.  
1.4. Limitations of the study 
The main limitations of the study are related to the actual details of the performance fees. 
Despite the fact that fund prospectuses disclose the existence and calculation basis of the 
performance fees, the level of detail in disclosure is at times relatively poor. Overall, based on 
the fund prospectuses it is challenging to form a holistic, detailed picture of the performance 
fees that is comparable across funds, as the variation in calculation methodologies and 
disclosure is considerable. When available, I utilize all of the documentation available related 
to funds (rules, Key Investor Information Document (KIID) and websites) to find out as much 
as possible about the calculation mechanics of the performance fee.  
One of the most significant limitations impacting the estimated value of the performance fee 
is the magnitude of the utilized high-water mark. As the value for the high-water mark 
changes across time, I opt to conduct the valuations at a single point in time, as of the 
beginning of 2013. I acquire the high-water mark for each of the funds in the sample utilizing 
the funds’ historical prices at the end of 2012. However, the value of the high-water mark 
relative to the fund’s year-end value understandably varies considerably across funds, 
consequently affecting the estimated value. To correct for this, I also calculate the value of the 
performance fee assuming that the high-water mark is set at the initial value of the fund at the 
beginning of a calculation period.  
The variety of the investment styles of the funds in the sample also poses challenges to the 
calculation of risk-adjusted returns. In order to conduct a robust risk-adjustment to the raw 
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returns of the funds in the sample, I require return data for explanatory portfolios for different 
investment styles. For data availability reasons, I opt to group the funds in my sample into 
five different geographical categories based on their investment focus. Consequently, 
different geographical explanatory portfolios were used for the risk-adjustment. However, the 
categorization of the funds into the five geographical categories does not always provide a 
perfect match with the actual investment style. As a result of this, the risk-adjustment to the 
raw returns may not always be completely accurate due to inherent differences in the fund 
portfolio and the explanatory portfolio. To ensure the robustness of my results and to counter 
for any erroneous categorizations in the risk-adjustment, I also run regressions on other 
dependent variables such as the Sharpe ratio and the raw, non-adjusted return.  
Furthermore, in cases where the performance fee is mathematically more complex (i.e. 
containing high-water marks or positivity constraints), finding a closed-form solution is 
impossible and numerical methods such as the binomial pyramid approach or Monte Carlo 
simulation need to be used to approximate the value of the fee. However, the use of numerical 
estimation methods is not a large limitation, as the simulated value of the fee converges to the 
actual value as the number of simulations increases.  
The calculation of the tracking errors and correlations also suffers from data availability 
issues. As benchmark return data is not available for all of the funds in the sample from 
sources at my disposal (primarily Bloomberg), I am forced to drop some of the funds for the 
purposes of the tracking error calculations. In general, the dropped funds are generally 
younger and have lower assets under management. 
The option valuation approach also suffers from some methodological limitations. Firstly, 
both the Margrabe (1978) model and basic form of the Monte Carlo simulation assume static 
fund volatility and correlation with the benchmark. In reality, however, the fund management 
has the opportunity to impact both of these factors in response to how much their performance 
fee option is in/out the money. There are some empirical indications that portfolio managers 
indeed do so (see e.g. Brown et al., 1996 and Huang et al. 2011). However, taking these 
factors into account by attempting to model the dynamic correlation between the fund and the 
benchmark and the changes in volatility is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In the comparison of total cost of ownership of funds with and without performance fees, I 
take into account only the running annual costs (i.e. the management fee) of the fund for two 
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reasons. Firstly, taking into account the one-off subscription and redemption fees in the 
comparison would require assumptions and/or data on the average holding period for each of 
the funds to calculate the assumed yearly cost associated with these fees. The holding period 
data is not available. Secondly, management fees represent the bulk of mutual fund 
companies’ income and consequently investors’ costs, contrary to subscription fees and 
redemption fees, which play a smaller role. 
One additional aspect of my thesis should also be noted. My definition of a performance fee 
funds does not include funds where investors pay a fixed fee but the portfolio manager is 
subject to compensation based on performance. Thus, the scope of this thesis is limited to 
funds that are contractually allowed to charge performance fees from investors, effectively 
excluding other forms of bonus compensation from my sample due to lack of available data. 
Thus, my approach implicitly ignores the impact of other incentivization mechanisms such as 
bonus payments to fund managers. 
1.5. Structure of thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview into the topic and existing 
literature by discussing both the existing research on the topic and principal-agent problem on 
a more general level. Furthermore, I provide a detailed overview into the regulation of 
performance fees in select European countries in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I discuss my 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents an overview on the used data, its key characteristics and 
limitations. Chapter 6 provides details and the results of my analysis. In chapter 7 I provide a 
discussion of my results and link my empirical observations to my research questions in 
previous literature. In chapter 8 I conclude with the key results of my research and the 
conclusions and also suggest areas for future research. 
1.6. Definitions 
Some of the possibly unfamiliar terminology used in this thesis is defined below in Table 1 to 
ensure that the reader is aware of exact meanings and definitions of terms used in this thesis 
and to make reading easier. 
Table 1: Definition of key terms used in the thesis 
Absolute risk-taking 
Behaviour, where the fund management takes more absolute risk as measured by 
the volatility of the fund’s returns. This can be achieved by e.g. utilizing more 
leverage or by investing in riskier instruments 
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Active risk-taking 
Behaviour, where the fund management takes more active risk as measured by the 
tracking error of the funds’ returns. This can be achieved by investing in securities 
not included in the fund’s benchmark or in securities that are negatively correlated 
with the fund’s benchmark. 
Asymmetric performance 
fee   
A fee type, where the fund management shares the upside of the return (i.e. the 
return exceeding the hurdle rate), but does not have to pay back the downside (i.e. 
in the case when the return is below the hurdle rate) 
AUM   Assets under management 
Back-end 
load/Redemption fee   A fee that investors pay when they are selling mutual fund shares 
Benchmark   A market index, interest rate or combination thereof to which a fund’s performance is compared 
Excess return   The part of a mutual fund’s return exceeding a preset benchmark 
Flow-performance 
relationship   
Observed phenomenon, where money flows into well-performing funds and out of 
poorly-performing funds. 
Front-end 
load/Subscription fee   
A commission or sales charge charged at the time of purchasing an investment. It is 
deducted from the investment amount 
Fulcrum fee   A symmetric performance fee; where total fees go up when the fund outperforms the benchmark and down in cases of underperformance 
High-water mark   If the fund contains a high-water mark provision, fund management is able to earn the incentive fee only in case that previous losses are recouped. 
Hurdle rate   Minimum return that needs to be earned before the performance fee starts accruing. Sometimes used synonymously with the benchmark. 
IOSCO   International organization of securities commissions, an international body setting global standards for securities regulations 
IRF   Investment Research Finland, also known as Suomen Sijoitustutkimus. A Finnish private company compiling data on Finnish mutual funds 
KIID   Key Investor Information Document, a document containing all the key information 
related to an investment vehicle 
Management fee   A type of fee that is charged annually by the fund administration, typically as a percentage of assets under management 
Net Asset Value (NAV) The value of a share in a fund. NAV is reported net of fees and returns calculated based on NAVs are consequently net returns. 
Participation rate   Portion of excess return that is paid to the fund management as an performance fee 
Positivity constraint 
A contractual restriction, under which the performance fee can only be charged 
when the absolute return of the fund is positive. In the absence of a positivity 
constraint, the performance fee can be charged in cases where the fund outperforms 
the benchmark but still produces a negative return 
TER   
Total Expense Ratio, a uniform measure expressing the total yearly expenses 
incurred by an investor investing in a mutual fund. It is calculated by dividing the 
total annual cost by fund’s average assets. TER includes performance fees and it is 
calculated on an ex post basis 
Tracking error   
Standard deviation of the difference between the returns of a fund and a benchmark. 
A higher tracking error implies higher deviation from the benchmark and 
consequently more active risk-taking. 
UCITS   
A European directive related to Undertakings in Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities setting out common regulatory approach to securities 
regulation in Europe 
Unitholders Unitholders is the number of shareholders in a fund. 
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2. Literature review 
In this section I provide an overview on the existing literature. First, I discuss on a general 
level the principal-agent problems in delegated portfolio management and theoretical optimal 
contracting models proposed in the literature. Next, I elaborate on the empirical literature on 
the impact of performance fees and contractual incentives on fund performance and fund 
management behaviour. Furthermore, I discuss other implicit disciplinary mechanisms that 
potentially impact the fund management’s behaviour. Finally, I provide an overview on the 
existing literature on the valuation of performance fees.  
2.1. Principal-agent problems in delegated portfolio management 
The issue of performance fees in mutual funds is simply an application of the traditional 
principal-agent problem described by Ross (1973). Agency theory is utilized in the study of 
various contractual relationships such as employer-employee relationships, insurance 
relationships and management-shareholder relationships. By extension, the same agency 
theoretic approach can be used to study the fiduciary investment relationship in the case of 
mutual funds. As Stracca (2006) notes, the subject has indeed been quite thoroughly 
investigated also in the context of delegated portfolio management.  
However, generally, there are two key differences between the cases of portfolio management 
and the standard principal-agent problem. First, in the asset management industry, the 
portfolio management problem is related to obtaining information from the portfolio manager 
instead of direct performance as is the case in the simplistic principal-agent setting. 
Essentially, the principal is unaware of whether the portfolio manager is talented or not. 
Secondly, the portfolio manager is able to control his response to the strength of the incentive 
signal via her portfolio allocation decisions, which effectively has a direct impact on both the 
variance and the size of returns, whereas typically the agent control either the return or the 
variance but not both (Stracca, 2006). 
In general, when facing an investment decision, the investor (principal) faces two 
unobservable factors. Firstly, the investor cannot easily observe the fund manager’s talent. 
Secondly, the investor is unable to observe the effort expended by the manager to actually 
utilize that talent to the investor’s benefit (Heinkel and Stoughton, 1994). Against this 
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background, the performance fees can be seen as a contractual mechanism to alleviate the 
informational asymmetries between the portfolio management and the investors. The 
performance fees, in theory, ensure that the management is incentivized to expend effort in a 
way beneficial to the investor and that the investor is able to consequently benefit from the 
manager’s efforts. 
The linear contracting rule, under which the portfolio manager gets a fixed management fee 
plus a share of the outcome of his efforts, is under rather general assumptions the optimal 
contract, as the contract type results in an optimal trade-off between the principal and the 
agent as well as inducing the agent to exert effort (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). The share 
which the agent gets from the profits is determined taking into account the relative risk 
aversion of the fund manager and the investor. In an optimal situation, the risk tolerance of 
the investor and the fund management are the same. 
Stoughton (1993) studies the moral hazard in a portfolio management context with the same 
two aforementioned informational asymmetries related to talent and effort as in the study by 
Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). Their study arrives at opposite results than that of Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1987). They argue that a linear incentive contract leads to a serious 
underinvestment problem, as long as the agent is strictly risk averse. The optimal effort to be 
exerted from the fund manager is higher, the greater the risk tolerance of the investor 
compared to the fund manager. To alleviate the underinvestment problem inherent in a linear 
contracting regime, quadratic contracts originally introduced by Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer 
(1985) need to be used. 
However, one of the two key issues related to performance fees is that they are asymmetric to 
fund management. The management is awarded for good performance, but not directly 
punished2 for poor performance. The other key issue is whether performance fees sufficiently 
incentivize the management to expend their personal resources into portfolio management. 
Starks (1987) provides an agency theoretic approach to the issue of symmetric fees. The study 
finds that the introduction of symmetric performance fees would provide the management 
incentives to select the investor’s desired risk level. However, the management will still 
expend a lower amount of resources on managing the portfolio than the investor would desire. 
                                                 
2
 Despite the absence of an explicit punishment mechanism in asymmetric performance fees, the fund holders 
can discipline the management by withdrawing their money out of the fund and consequently reducing the 
management’s compensation via lower AUM. 
  13 
Interestingly, even though incentive compensation is relatively seldom used in contracts 
between the fund investors and investment advisors as observed by Elton et al. (2003), the 
percentage of portfolio managers receiving variable (salary-plus-bonus) compensation is very 
high. Ma et al. (2012) observe that three quarters of portfolio managers receive performance-
based-bonuses, so there indeed is (from an investor’s perspective) an indirect incentivization 
mechanism that rewards management for good performance. 
Stracca (2006) surveys the theoretical literature on delegated portfolio management in his 
study. In a case, where there are no informational asymmetries between the fund manager and 
the investor prior to signing the portfolio management contract, the optimal contract problem 
is reduced to one of optimal risk sharing. However, in reality there is information asymmetry 
both before and after signing the contract. In these cases, the finding based on the literature 
survey is that the search for an optimal contract has proved to be inconclusive even in the 
simplest of settings.  
Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) study the dynamics of portfolio management contracts in a 
two-period context and find that in an optimal case, the initial contract contains a smaller 
performance-based fee component than in the second-period contract. The thought underlying 
their model is the idea of tournaments, in which the fund’s performance is assessed relative to 
other managers so that the manager is retained whenever his performance is good enough 
relative to other alternatives. In their two-period model, in the first period client’s interests are 
primarily satisfied via the manager’s fear of dismissal with a lower performance fee 
component, whereas in the second period the contract structure will have a higher 
performance fee component. Essentially, in the first period the management is paid less as 
they have to prove their capabilities. After having proved their capabilities, the investor tries 
to incentivize the management to further utilize their proven skills via using a higher 
performance-based fee. 
Das and Sundaram (2002) approach the fee structure partially from a signaling and risk-
sharing perspective. Based on their research, the fee structure utilized by an investment 
adviser has three distinct roles. Firstly, it influences trading behaviour via giving incentives to 
the adviser. Secondly, it determines return-sharing and thus it serves as a risk-sharing 
mechanism. Thirdly, the type of fee contract can be used as a device for signaling. Based on 
their model, they find, that incentive fees lead to riskier portfolios than fulcrum fees. 
Interestingly, they find that investor interests may be better satisfied under asymmetric fees 
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compared to fulcrum fees and that asymmetric fees are never strictly worse than fulcrum fees. 
This view is contrary to that of Starks (1987), who finds that symmetric performance fee is 
preferred over asymmetric one, as it can align the agent’s attitude to risk closer to the 
principal’s attitude. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) study the use of benchmark-adjusted compensation. In their 
model, they find that commonly used benchmark-adjusted compensation contracts do not 
share risk optimally, do not result in the optimal portfolio for the investor, do not screen out 
bad managers and tend to weaken manager’s incentives to expend effort. Thus, the findings 
are in contrast to those of Das and Sundaram (2002). However, in the study no limits are 
placed on the fund managers’ ability to change volatility. In reality, however, fund managers 
are subject to a variety of risk limits and controls, which effectively reduce their ability to 
influence fund volatility. 
An intriguing feature of the performance fee compensation is the use of so-called high-water 
marks (loss-recovery provisions). Aragon and Qian (2007) study the use of high-water marks 
in hedge fund compensation. In their model, high-water marks increase the entry costs for 
poor managers and act as an ex-ante certification of management quality when fund 
withdrawals are restricted. They argue that high-water marks are a way for high-quality 
managers to reduce the costs associated with the adverse selection. 
Contrary to the study of Aragon and Qian (2007), a paper by Zhan (2011) finds that 
asymmetric performance fees are suboptimal compared to fulcrum fees. They argue that the 
use of high-water marks mitigates the suboptimality problem, but only to a limited extent. 
The overall theoretical discussion above focuses primarily on the optimal contract design 
within a principal-agency framework, where the focus is on inducing the agent to exert effort 
and to utilize his talent to the benefit of the principal. However, the role of reputation of the 
manager also acts as an implicit incentive. The essence of this argument is captured by the 
saying of fund observer Mark Hurley “that the real business of money management is not 
managing money; it is getting money to manage.”  
Consequently, in the real world, fund management is a multi-period game where the career 
concerns of managers may motivate them to undertake costly efforts (Stracca, 2006). This is 
also captured theoretically in the aforementioned Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) paper with a 
two-period model, where the principal’s interests in the first period are satisfied by providing 
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incentives through the threat of being fired after poor performance. Only in the second period, 
when the threat of firing does not exist, is the incentive fee higher. This logic captures, in my 
view, the essence of the problem in delegated portfolio management and optimal contracts. In 
a multi-period setting, different contract types are required for each period as the 
informational asymmetries on capabilities of the manager are alleviated and the issue changes 
from information acquisition to manager incentivization. 
Overall, based on the theoretical literature on delegated portfolio management, the issue of the 
optimal portfolio management contract remains unsolved. The use of asymmetric fees is 
justified on the basis that they bring the agent’s risk-taking closer to levels preferred by the 
principal. However, in reality, the use of asymmetric performance fees is relatively 
uncommon, despite their intuitive appeal. This counterintuitive observation can however 
plausibly explained by the fact that portfolio managers operate in a multi-period setting in 
which reputational concerns and potential future inflows act as an implicit incentive so that 
explicit contractual performance-based incentives are no longer needed. 
The area where the proposed theoretical models collide with real-world is exactly related to 
the multi-period setting in which managers operate. In the aforementioned theoretical models 
managers are assumed to optimize with regards to one-period or two-period wealth, but in 
reality counteracting forces such as reputational concerns, fear of being fired or the negative 
impact of today’s excess risk-taking on future fees complicate the modeling.  
2.2. Impact of performance fees on fund returns 
One natural empirical question to ask is whether performance fees indeed work in the sense 
that funds with such fee structures provide superior risk-adjusted returns to investors. Despite 
the extensive research on the impact of mutual fund fees on returns and return persistence, 
this particular question is researched surprisingly little in the context of mutual funds. 
Golec (1988) studies whether funds with performance fees outperform those without. The 
results show that funds with performance fees exhibit relatively better returns compared to 
funds without. The difference in alphas is 1.59%. The study finds that larger funds seem to be 
more inclined to use performance fees, as the average fund with performance fees is $691 
million larger than the average sample fund. 
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A study by Massa and Patgiri (2009) approaches the incentive issue from another angle. They 
conducted a study on the impact of contractual incentives on mutual fund performance in the 
United States. They quantify the shape of the incentive structure3 and estimate the impact of 
the fund incentives on risk and return. They group funds into quintiles based on incentives 
and find that high-incentive funds have a positive alpha. The top quintile in terms of 
incentives outperforms lowest quintile by 22 basis points per month in terms of risk-adjusted 
return. The superior risk-adjusted performance is also found to be persistent.  
Elton et al. (2003) study the relationship between incentive fees and mutual funds. The study 
finds that funds with incentive fees exhibit stock-picking ability, but they do not on average 
earn performance fees. In the world of hedge funds, where the use of performance fees is 
more common, research is also more numerous. One of the key studies in the area is by 
Ackermann et al. (2002) who find that incentive fees explain some of the higher performance 
of hedge funds when compared to mutual funds. 
Overall, it is striking to note that there is very little variation in the contractual fees in mutual 
funds (Lakonishok et al., 1992). The key finding is that past returns have very little 
explanatory power on fees. In other words, good performance is not reflected in fee levels, 
although the flow-performance relationship will increase absolute compensation for managers 
of well-performing funds. 
2.3. Performance fees and fund management behaviour 
One way to mitigate the principal-agent problem between fund management and investors is 
to align interests more closely by using performance fees, which are effectively a form of 
option compensation. Carpenter (2000) provides a rigorous analysis of option compensation 
and managerial risk appetite. Based on her model, she finds that option compensation does 
not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Rather, fund volatility is adjusted in response to asset 
value changes. Intuitively, when the manager’s option is near the money and close to 
evaluation date, small changes in the asset value lead to aggressive actions to get “in the 
money”. She finds that management increase (decrease) volatility in case the fund’s return is 
below (above) the hurdle rate. Thus, the impact of the incentive compensation on the fund 
volatility depends on how much the performance option is in/out the money. However, the 
                                                 
3
 If the fees are flat (a fixed percentage) regardless of fund assets, they are linear. If they decrease along with 
fund size, they are concave. 
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study only assumes the behaviour takes place during a single, discrete period of time, contrary 
to the discussion in part 2.1 related to the complexities of a multi-period setting. 
A study by Panageas and Westerfield (2009) provides a slightly contrasting viewpoint to that 
of Carpenter (2000) by arguing that management who is compensated with a performance fee 
with a hurdle rate provision will place a constant fraction of investments in risky assets, if the 
management faces an infinite time horizon. This is explained by the fact that in reality, the 
management isn’t facing a single-period choice when it comes to adjusting the fund risk. 
Rather, they are holding a series of options extending into the future. Excessive risk-taking 
today to increase today’s option value decreases the value of future options and hence 
management effectively optimize under multiple time periods. 
Clare and Motson (2009) research empirically how hedge fund managers adjust their funds’ 
risk profile when comparing their relative performance to peers. The study finds that 
managers of relatively poorly (strongly) returning funds increase (decrease) risk. Thus, 
relative performance compared to other hedge funds plays a role in risk. The study also 
examines the question of how the incentive option moneyness affects risk. Managers with in-
the-money options (i.e. performance in excess of the hurdle rate) decrease risk and lock in 
their profits. However, the reaction is asymmetric for managers who are out of money, who 
do not increase risk to increase their option value. Thus, interestingly, managers seem to want 
lock profits, but not increase risk when performance takes a turn for the worse. The latter 
reaction is potentially explained by the Panageas and Westerfield (2009) finding; managers 
facing indefinite time horizons face a trade-off between increasing variance in the current 
period and getting a penalty in terms of a decrease in the value of the future options. Thus, 
despite poor mid-year performance, management doesn’t take aggressive actions to get in the 
money due to the fact that this would place future income at risk. 
However, the above finding of Clare and Motson (2009) is contrasted by findings of Brown et 
al. (1996), who have different observations in the case of mutual funds when the 
compensation is linked to relative performance. They find that mid-year losers increase 
subsequent fund volatility to a greater degree than mid-year winners. 
The aforementioned risk-shifting phenomenon, in which fund managers actively adjust the 
fund’s risk levels in response to the moneyness of their performance fee option, has also 
empirically observed implication on returns. Huang et al. (2011) find that risk-shifting funds 
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perform worse compared to funds which have stable risk levels over time. Combining this 
finding with the empirical results of Clare and Motson (2009) would imply that in the case of 
mutual funds the risk-shifting behaviour, regardless of whether it is caused by self-interested 
managerial incentives or legitimate trading needs, has negative consequences in terms of 
returns to fund owners. 
Further support to the hypothesis of active risk adjustment by fund management is given by a 
study of Giambona and Golec (2009) who find that compensation incentives partly drive fund 
managers’ market volatility timing strategies and that larger performance fees lead to more 
procyclical volatility timing. 
Elton et al. (2003) examine the effect of performance fees on fund manager behaviour. The 
study finds that performance fee funds take more risk than non-performance fee funds and 
that risk-taking increases after a period of poor performance. Funds with performance fees 
exhibit better stock selection ability than funds not utilizing performance fees. Interestingly, 
performance fee funds have beta less than one, indicating that they do not outperform their 
benchmark. The market seems to reward funds with performance fees as flows into these 
funds are greater than those into non-performance fee funds. However, the use of performance 
fees is rather uncommon; in 1999 only 108 out of 6716 funds used performance fees. 
Gehrig et al. (2008) study the relationship between bonus payments and fund management 
behaviour using a unique survey sent out to fund managers in Germany, Switzerland and the 
United States. The study finds that bonus payments do stimulate effort but that there is little 
evidence of bonuses inducing risk-taking, which is quite interesting, given that some other 
studies (for example Elton et al., 2003) have found a relationship between incentive 
compensation and risk-taking. In my view, this may be possibly explained the fact that Gehrig 
et al. (2008) research bonuses on a higher level, which means that factors like tenure and fund 
size are determinants of the bonus size. Furthermore, fund managers are fairly unlikely to 
admit that they are taking more risk in response to bonus compensation in a survey, which 
possibly leads to a bias in the results. 
Furthermore, the same study by Gehrig et al. (2008) measures risk-taking by comparing the 
maximum allowed tracking error to the manager and the actual realized tracking error, which 
essentially measures how much active risk the management is taking by active investing, 
whereas Elton et al. (2003) measure risk simply by volatility, These two approaches, are in 
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my view, not comparable, as volatility measures absolute risk levels whereas tracking errors 
only measures deviations from the benchmark.  
Gehrig et al. (2008) also find that bonus payments also make fund managers more sensitive to 
fundamental information. Interestingly, there are quite large geographical variations in the 
relative weight of bonus compensation. Based on responses, the share of bonus compensation 
relative to base salary is quite large; the median bonus for U.S. fund managers is 100% (mean 
is 184%). However, in the European markets these figures are lower. The median bonus in 
Germany is 25% and the mean 30%, whereas the Swiss figures are quite similar at 30% and 
37% respectively.  
Overall, the empirical support for risk-shifting behaviour is mixed. In a single-period setting 
managers have an incentive to increase risk. Moreover, ceteris paribus, managers with poor 
mid-year performance have an incentive to take risk to get back in the money. However, these 
incentives are dampened by the fact that management operate in a multi-period setting where 
increasing risk in the first period has a negative impact on the probable income in the 
subsequent periods. These mixed empirical findings are in line with the discussion in part 2.1, 
where single-period optimization concerns were dampened by concerns related to future value 
of fee income. 
2.4. Other implicit disciplinary mechanisms for fund management 
As discussed, the performance fees are an explicit contractual mechanism aligning the 
interests of the investor and the fund management. Moreover, due to the fund management’s 
fiduciary responsibility towards their investors, the fund management might face legal 
liability for actions clearly not in the investors’ interest. However, there are a variety of other, 
implicit disciplinary mechanisms, which essentially provide the management incentives to 
make decisions that are aligned with the investors’ interests. These mechanisms and the 
accompanying research are briefly discussed below. 
The observed flow-performance relationship has a clear impact on the fund management 
compensation; the higher the AUM, the higher the base fee in dollar terms. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) shed light on the relationship between fund flows and end-of-year 
performance. Year-end fund performance is known to have a notable impact on inflows in 
subsequent years. Thus funds can increase their expected future inflows by increasing fourth-
quarter variance and consequently expected returns. The study shows that the empirically 
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observed flow-performance relationship may generate incentives for funds to alter the 
riskiness of their portfolios. Funds are also empirically found to respond to this incentive 
scheme by increasing their risk in hopes of attracting higher flows. 
Moreover, as Chevalier and Ellison (1997) discuss, the flow-performance relationship can be 
seen as an implicit incentive mechanism forcing management to maximize returns. 
Essentially, the investors always have the option to vote with their feet and take their money 
elsewhere, which incentivizes the management of the fund to perform well. 
Drago et al. (2010) study mutual fee fund structure in a free-contracting environment using 
data from Italy, where regulatory constraints on mutual funds before 2006 were very light. 
They find that majority of equity funds charged performance fees whereas performance fees 
were less frequent for other types of funds. The study finds that incentive provisions are 
actually a part of strategic pricing policies by fund managers to get investors to sign up to the 
fund.  
2.5. Valuation of the performance fee option 
Overall, studies, where the value of the performance fee option is quantified, are rather scarce. 
In an unfinished working paper, Drago et al. (2005) attempt to value the performance fees in 
Italy, where funds are not restricted from charging performance fees. They find that on 
average, the value of the performance fees is 0.5%, but it can reach levels as high as 2.2% 
with a fat-tailed distribution.  
Quite interestingly, in my view, the investor is writing the option to the fund management 
without actually being compensated or probably even aware of the premium involved. Thus, 
in this sense, the performance fee is an additional form of fund management compensation by 
investors, who are probably unaware of the magnitude of the cost of the option they are 
effectively writing. Furthermore, Kritzman (1987) provide a short empirical example on 
valuing the performance fee using the Margrabe (1978) model. Under their assumptions, they 
arrive at a value of $18,900 for each $10,000,000. Moreover, Margrabe (1978) provides an 
empirical example involving incentive compensation in mutual funds along with his 
introduction of a model valuing the option to exchange one asset for another.  
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3. Regulatory approaches to performance fees in Europe and the U.S. 
Prior to proceeding to data and empirical tests, I provide a descriptive overview on the 
different regulatory approaches utilized across select European countries and the United 
States to illustrate both the varying approaches towards performance fees as well as to provide 
some context for the discussion of regulatory implications of my results. 
3.1. Common principles from the UCITS IV directive and the IOSCO 
The basic principles of performance fee regulation in Europe stem from two sources: the 
UCITS IV directive4 and IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) 
framework. The UCITS directive sets out minimum regulations but leaves the implementation 
to the national legislation. The UCITS directive in general does not address performance fees 
on a very granular level; it rather sets out the basic principles and guidelines against which the 
use and nature of performance fees must be compared. 
IOSCO is an international body which joins international regulators and sets global standards. 
According to its website, its members regulate 95% of the world’s securities markets and it 
has over 120 securities regulators as its members. In its document, “Elements of International 
Regulatory Standards on Fees and Expenses of Investment Funds”, the IOSCO sets out basic 
guidelines for the use of performance fees. The following five basic principles are stated with 
further clarifications 
A performance fee should not create an incentive for the management company to 
take excessive risks in the hope of increasing its performance fee. 
A performance fee should be consistent with the fund’s investment objectives and 
should not create an incentive for the operator to take undue risks and should not 
deny investors an adequate remuneration of the return from the risks taken on their 
behalf and previously accepted 
Investors should be adequately informed of the existence of the performance fee and 
of its potential impact on the return that they will get on their investment. 
A performance fee should not result in a breach of the principle of equality of 
investors. 
Investors should be adequately informed of the existence of the performance fee and 
of its potential impact on the return that they will get on their investment. 
                                                 
4
 UCITS (Undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities) is a European Parliament directive 
related to coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions. It has been introduced to have 
common regulatory approach to investment vehicles across Europe. 
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The basic principles set out in the IOSCO recommendations contain some granular 
instructions on the specifics of performance fees, which are rather intriguing in the context of 
my research 
The payment frequency should be reasonable. At least one year is considered a 
reasonable period. 
The excess performance of the fund for purpose of calculating a performance fee 
should be assessed after deduction of all costs borne by the fund, 
If a performance fee can be levied even if the absolute return of the fund is negative 
(this can occur if the fund outperforms its reference), this should be clearly stated 
in the description of the performance fee. 
This [informing investors adequately of the performance fee’s potential impact] can 
be achieved by requiring that the fund operator give concrete examples of how the 
performance fee will be calculated rather than making a theoretical description of 
the performance fee. 
Based on my sample of Finnish funds, these general principles are not always followed.5 
Calculation period is quite often considerably shorter than a year. Quite often the funds do not 
clearly disclose whether the performance fee is calculated based on net or gross return. Some 
funds do disclose that the performance fee is not charged in cases of absolute negative 
performance. However, disclosure of charging the performance fee with absolute negative 
performance is quite rare. Furthermore, concrete examples are in general used very seldom. 
3.2. National approaches used by European and U.S. regulators 
The existing research on performance fees is rather limited. The compensation regulation in 
the U.S. is based on the Investment Company Act of 1940, under which investment 
companies’ compensation cannot be based on capital gains. 6 However, the act was amended 
in 1970 and so-called fulcrum fees were introduced, under which the fund’s fee is symmetric 
around an index. However, asymmetric bonuses for beating the benchmark were still not 
allowed. Another amendment was made in 1985 when the Securities Exchange Commission 
allowed the unrestricted use of performance fees under two conditions. The investor needs to 
have invested at least $500,000 in the fund or if the client has a net worth of at least 
$1,000,000. In 1998 these limits were amended to $750,000 and $1,500,000, respectively. In 
                                                 
5
 In order to form an overall picture on the adherence to these recommendations, I compare the prospectus-stated 
disclosure of performance fees to the aforementioned principles. Summary of this approach is available in 
Appendix A 
6
 Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR Part 275, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/ia-3372.pdf 
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July 2011, these limits were once again increased to $1,000,000 and $2,000,000, respectively. 
Inflation adjustments to these limits are being introduced. 
In Europe, the national approach varies considerably across countries. Some of the regulators 
(e.g. Germany) have issued very specific recommendations related to the implementation of 
the UCITS IV directive and its relation to performance fees, whereas other regulators have no 
explicit regulators and rely more on a principles-based approach. In this chapter I will outline 
the different regulatory approaches utilized in seven countries. Four of these (Finland, 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark) were selected to provide geographical context to my study. 
The other three (Ireland, Germany and Luxembourg) were selected based on their importance 
to the fund management industry. A high-level overview of the different regulatory 
approaches is provided in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Summary of different regulatory approaches to performance fees 
This table presents a high-level overview of the different regulatory approaches to performance fees. The data 
has been gathered via e-mails and phone calls to national regulators and trade associations. It has been 
complemented by documents obtained from the regulators website. 
Country Summary of approach Source 
Denmark 
Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. No 
explicit regulation or regulator's recommendations. The use of 
performance fees has never been practice in Denmark. 
Finanstilsynet 
(email) 
Finland Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. No 
explicit regulation. Focus on adequate disclosure of fees. 
Finanssivalvonta 
(email) 
Germany 
Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. Model 
terms set out by the BaFin. Approach differs depending on whether 
benchmark or a hurdle rate used. Minimum calculation period of 1 year. 
High-water marks in force and cumulative positive performance required. 
BaFin (email) 
Ireland 
Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. National 
regulator's recommendations on UCITS implementation stricter than in 
most other countries.  
Central Bank of 
Ireland (email) 
Luxembourg 
Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. No 
specific regulation in the same sense as in e.g. Germany. Auditor is 
required to notify regulator, if there's discrepancies in calculations. 
Benchmark must be in line with fund's investment style. 
CSSF (phone call) 
Norway 
Based on national legislation following UCITS IV principles. Only 
fulcrum fees allowed after 2000 for retail funds. Asymmetric fees 
allowed for funds with a minimum investment of 500 000 NOK. 
Regulation in force via a circular. Aim to minimize risk-taking incentives 
Finanstilsynet (email 
+ phone call) 
Sweden Based on UCITS IV directive and its national implementation. No 
explicit regulation. Focus on adequate disclosure of fees. 
Fondbolagen (email 
+ phone call) 
United States 
Charging asymmetric incentive fees from low net worth (<$1m 
investment in fund or <$2m net worth) investors prohibited. Fulcrum fees 
allowed 
SEC rules 
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The use and regulation of performance fees varies notably even within Scandinavia. Based on 
e-mails and interviews with regulators and mutual fund associations, I managed to form a 
comprehensive picture on the performance fee use within Scandinavia. Overall, all of the 
countries do not regulate performance fees on a very granular level, apart from Norway. The 
regulation is rather principles-based, under which mutual funds have to carry out their 
activities in accordance with business rules and they must strive to avoid conflicts of interest 
by placing the unitholders’ interests above those of the management company. This principle 
effectively bans different types of self-interested behaviour such as manipulating the 
benchmark or performance fee calculation parameters, even in the absence of explicit 
regulation. 
In Norway, contrary to other Scandinavian countries, the use of performance fees is limited to 
fulcrum (symmetric fees). Asymmetric fees are allowed only in cases, where the initial 
investment is at least NOK 5 million or more. This limitation has been in force since 2000, 
when the Finanstilsynet (Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority) issued a circular letter7 
on asymmetric performance fees. However, funds that charged asymmetric performance fees 
prior to the introduction of the regulation were still allowed to do. Indeed, one of the biggest 
funds in Norway (Skagen Kon-Tiki), as measured by AUM, charges asymmetric performance 
fees. Interestingly, in the circular letter, the regulator considered asymmetric compensation as 
a potential source of conflict of interest and a driver for excess risk-taking. In the letter, 
Finanstilsynet effectively banned the use of asymmetric performance fees in funds targeted at 
retail investors. This regulatory approach deviates significantly from the “hands-off” 
regulatory regime utilized in other Scandinavian countries, where the focus is primarily on 
disclosure aspects.  
In Finland, based on answers I received from Finanssivalvonta (the Finnish Financial 
Supervisory Authority), the focus is on adequate disclosure of fees. The calculation or details 
of performance fees are not regulated explicitly. Overall, the overarching aim of the 
regulatory regime in Finland is to ensure adequate, transparent and understandable disclosure 
of fees. However, the fund rules need to be accepted by Finanssivalvonta, and according to 
the regulator, fund fee structure is inspected during this acceptance process.  
In Sweden, the regulatory approach is very similar to that in Finland. The regulation is based 
on the UCITS directive, which does not address performance fees in detail. UCITS only 
                                                 
7
 http://www.finanstilsynet.no/no/Artikkelarkiv/Rundskriv/2000-2001/Asymmetrisk-forvaltningsgodtgjorelse/ 
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stipulates the general principles of the regulation, which, in theory, can be complemented by 
national regulation national regulation, as the UCITS directive is a “minimum-binding” 
directive. However, the regulator in Sweden has not yet adopted any complementary 
regulation on performance fees and, based on the view of the trade association, is unlikely to 
do so.  
Denmark has a similar regulatory approach as Sweden. The use of performance fees is 
allowed. However, according to the Finanstilsynet (Danish Financial Supervisory Authority), 
the use of performance fees has never been normal practice in the industry, which is why 
they’re very rare in Danish funds. The use of performance fees is allowed under the Danish 
UCITS law and as in Sweden, the legislation can be complemented by issuing an executive 
order.  
Luxembourg, which is the largest fund management country in terms of AUM, also utilizes a 
relatively non-technical approach to the regulation of performance fees. Based on information 
extracted in an interview I conducted with the head division for supervision of UCIs, the 
performance fees are not explicitly regulated in Luxembourg. However, fund prospectuses 
must be accepted by the regulator prior to beginning of operations. Anecdotally, based on my 
discussions with the regulator, the prospectuses are often revised. For example, one of the 
funds applying for a license originally attempted to charge the performance fee based on the 
highest value of the fund during the calculation period, an attempt which was, for obvious 
reasons, thwarted by the regulator. In the prospectus inspection phase, the regulator inspects 
that the disclosure of the performance fee component is understandably and explicitly 
disclosed. Furthermore, the performance fee benchmark is required to be in line with the 
fund’s stated investment style. 
In Luxembourg, the fund’s auditor is also required to ensure that the actual calculation and 
charging of the performance fee corresponds to the stated calculation methodology in the 
prospectus. If there are discrepancies between the actual calculation methodology and the 
stated calculation methodology, the auditor is legally required to notify the regulator of the 
observation.  
In Ireland, another large asset management country, the performance fee regulation is again 
rather principles-based. The regulation is largely based on the UCITS IV-directive 
implementation. The guidelines provided by the Irish Central Bank, the regulator, shed some 
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additional light into the topic. Interestingly, in the guidelines8 part 2.17.11(g), the following is 
stated: 
“The investment manager/adviser should only receive a performance fee if the assets 
which it has responsibility for have actually increased in value during the period” 
Thus, the regulator effectively recommends the use of a positivity constraint. The calculation 
of the performance fee needs to be verified by the custodian. Furthermore, the regulator 
requires the use of a high-water mark in the charging of a performance fee, which is an 
interesting deviation from the more principles-based approach utilized in other countries. For 
non-UCITS funds, performance fees may also be charged. 
In Germany, which is also a large player in the asset management industry, the regulatory 
approach is similar to other countries. Based on e-mail exchange with the BaFin 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority), performance fees are allowed in Germany. Performance fees can only be charged 
only in cases of sustainable long-run performance. The BaFin does not regulate the nominal 
amount of the performance fee. The regulation of performance fees has been in force since 1st 
of July 2011, when the UCITS IV directive was included in the German law. The BaFin, 
contrary to some of the other regulators, has published model terms related to fund fees 
clarifying the BaFin interpretation of the UCITS IV requirements with regards to performance 
fees. As is suitable for a German regulator, the model terms are very specific and granular in 
nature and accompanied by specific instructions. 
However, very interestingly, contrary to other regulatory approaches, the BaFin model terms 
require that any negative previous performance must be compensated before the performance 
fees can be charged. BaFin splits the use of performance fees into two types: firstly into cases 
where the performance fee is charged relative to a benchmark and secondly into cases where 
the performance fee is charged relative to a fixed hurdle rate.  
In the first approach where the performance fee is charged for outperforming the benchmark, 
the BaFin approach is very different compared to the Nordic countries. Underperformance is 
carried forward and the underperformance must be compensated before any performance fee 
can be charged. Furthermore, in line with the IOSCO framework stipulated in 3.1, the 
                                                 
8
 The Central Bank of Ireland has provided application forms for the UCITS funds, available at 
http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/industry-sectors/funds/ucits/Pages/forms.aspx 
  27 
calculation period must be at least one year. Additionally, the BaFin explicitly notes that 
charging the performance fee in cases with absolute negative performance is allowed. 
In the second approach, where the performance fee is charged for outperforming a fixed 
hurdle rate, the regulatory approach is again very detailed. Also in this case, the calculation 
period must be a minimum of 12 months. Interestingly, the regulator requires the use of a 
high-water mark with a five year memory. In the second approach, the performance fee may 
only be charged if the NAV of the fund is higher than the highest end-of-year NAV from the 
preceding five years. 
3.3. Finnish mutual funds and the IOSCO guidelines 
As discussed in part 3.1, the International Organization of Securities Commissions has 
established guidelines on the elements for international standards on investment company 
fees, including specific recommendations on the use of performance fees. In this part, I 
compare the stipulated recommendations of the IOSCO and the prospectus disclosure for 
Finnish mutual funds utilizing performance fees. A detailed summary of the comparison is 
available in Appendix A. 
Overall, the level of detail in the disclosure of performance fees is relatively poor in light of 
the IOSCO recommendations. Funds very seldom reveal whether the performance fee is 
calculated after deducting the fixed periodic management fee from the net return. 
Furthermore, contrary to IOSCO recommendations, very few funds provide examples on how 
the performance fee is calculated. The lack of examples combined with lack of detail in 
disclosure make it more difficult for the investor to form a holistic picture on the actual costs 
of the fund. 
With regards to the actual calculation mechanics of the performance fee, Finnish funds have 
varying conventions. Majority of the funds in the sample follow a calculation period of one 
year, albeit with some variation. However, not a single fund follows a longer calculation 
period even though the one year is the recommended minimum length. The benchmark 
utilized in the calculation of the performance fee is practically always the same as the 
benchmark used in performance assessment. This principle is not followed only in cases 
where the fund does not have a predetermined benchmark. 
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4. Hypotheses 
Based on questions raised in existing literature, my study tests different aspects related to 
performance fees and their impact on fund risk-return profiles. This section outlines the 
hypotheses that are tested in the empirical section of this study and provides a brief theoretical 
background behind the stated hypotheses. In addition to empirically testing the hypotheses 
outlined in this section, I conduct analyses on the more descriptive aspects of performance 
fees such as their theoretical value and regulation, as discussed in section 1.2. 
4.1. Performance fees and fund return 
Theoretically, contractual incentives such as performance fees should decrease conflicts of 
interest between principals (fund investors) and agents (fund management). Ex ante, 
performance fees can be seen as an incentivization mechanism towards fund management, 
which are designed to solicit the fund management to exert effort and use their potentially 
superior knowledge in the interest of investors (Stracca, 2006). The extra efforts expended by 
the fund management in the hopes of gaining a payoff from the performance fee can thus be 
expected to lead to higher returns, if the fund management is superior versus other investors 
and/or holds superior knowledge. 
Empirically, higher managerial incentives have been found to be associated with improved 
return performance. The relationship has been observed in various studies (e.g. Golec, 1988; 
Massa and Patgiri, 2009; Elton et al., 2003) approaching the problem from various angles, 
either by quantifying the value of incentives for fund management (see e.g. Agarwal et al., 
2009) or by simply using a dummy for performance fees. Empirical results from prior 
literature thus provide support to the hypothesis that higher managerial incentives are 
associated with improved performance. 
Existing literature and theory on the relationship between managerial incentives and 
performance enable me to devise my first hypothesis on the relationship between performance 
fees and returns in Finnish mutual funds: 
H1: The use of performance fees in Finnish mutual funds is associated with superior 
performance 
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4.2. Performance fees and fund risk 
Existing theoretical literature has focused on the risk-inducing characteristics of performance 
fees and option compensation. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Carpenter (2000) provide 
both empirical and theoretical insight into the topic. Despite multiple theoretical and 
empirical papers, the existing literature is yet to find a definitive answer whether option 
compensation of fund management leads to higher risk, which provides an interesting 
research question to be empirically tested. 
From an option valuation perspective, performance fees can be seen as a type of option. The 
value of an option is positively correlated with the volatility of the underlying asset, which in 
this case is a function of the correlation of returns and the volatility of fund returns 
(Margrabe, 1978). If the fund management is conducting actions to maximize the value of 
their option, I should, ceteris paribus, observe differing risk levels for funds with performance 
fees. The fund management is able to achieve higher value for their option primarily via two 
ways: either by increasing the volatility of the funds’ returns or by increasing the deviation of 
the returns from the benchmark (i.e. by increasing the fund’s tracking error). In fact, as 
discussed in section 3, the Norwegian and U.S. regulators have cited the risk-inducing 
incentives of performance fees as the basis for banning the fees altogether from retail 
investors. 
The aforementioned theory and literature lead me to my second hypotheses on the 
relationship between performance fees and fund risk 
H2: The use of performance fees in Finnish mutual funds is associated with higher standard 
deviation of returns 
H3: Funds with performance fees exhibit higher tracking errors compared to funds without 
performance fees 
The hypotheses are tested utilizing Finnish mutual fund risk and return data, which is 
described in the following chapter. 
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5. Data 
In this chapter, I provide an overview into the data used in the research and descriptive 
information on the use of performance fees in Finnish funds. Furthermore, I detail the various 
calculations performed on the raw data performed prior to the actual analysis on the dataset.  
5.1. Overview of data used in research and data gathering 
My data consists of quarterly data on 332 open-ended mutual funds registered in Finland. The 
sample spans from March 2007 to December 2012. The sample has been obtained primarily 
from two sources: Morningstar, an investment fund database company and Investment 
Research Finland (also known as Suomen Sijoitustutkimus, henceforth referred to as IRF), a 
provider of investment portfolio measurement and reporting services in Finland. 
The data is, to the best of my knowledge, free from survivorship bias, as the Morningstar 
sample contains obsolete funds from the sample period. Moreover, the IRF sample consists of 
a total of 24 quarterly reports containing detailed information on all mutual funds in Finland. 
Thus, both samples contain data on obsolete funds.  
In line with previous research, I exclude non-equity funds from my sample. The funds in the 
sample are growth units, where dividends and other capital gains are reinvested into the fund. 
Thus, income-generating units (often denoted in Finnish as ‘tuotto’ units) of funds are 
excluded. Moreover, to ensure observation independence, I deleted duplicate observations in 
the sample, which was an issue with some of the IRF data. In the Morningstar data, some 
funds were denominated in multiple currencies. In these cases, I retained only the units 
denominated in euros.  
The IRF/Morningstar data is complemented by manually gathered data from two sources. As 
the details related to performance fees such as the use of high-water marks and positivity 
constraints is not documented in Morningstar data or IRF data, I gathered these details 
manually from current and historical fund prospectuses and rules. For obsolete funds, I 
acquired the missing prospectuses via an e-mail request from the appropriate fund company.  
Secondly, to ensure data correctness, I utilize Bloomberg data to cross-reference NAVs and 
latest fees against the data acquired from Morningstar and IRF. The aforementioned three data 
sources (Bloomberg, IRF and Morningstar) are consolidated manually into a single sample. 
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Morningstar data on fund characteristics (elaborated in Panel B of Table 3 below) is cross-
checked against Bloomberg data to ensure correctness of the data. Moreover, fee data 
obtained from Morningstar is also cross-checked against IRF data to ensure correctness. All 
calculated returns in the sample are on a net basis, as they are calculated based on Net Asset 
Values, which are reported on an after-fee basis. Correlation matrix of key variables is 
provided in Table 4 below. 
Table 3: Overview of the sample  
The sample has been constructed from data acquired from two sources: Morningstar, a fund database company, 
and Investment Research Finland, a Finnish company specializing in gathering and reporting data for Finnish 
mutual funds. The sample contains in total 332 euro-denominated mutual funds registered in Finland that have 
been active between 2007 and 2012 or that are still active. The sample data is free from survivorship bias, as it 
contains also such funds that have become obsolete or that have been liquidated. 
  
In cases of funds with multiple share classes, I have dropped so-called income classes and retained growth 
classes to ensure observation independence. These growth funds reinvest dividends and interest income back 
into the fund and do not periodically pay income to their unitholders. For funds with classes denominated in 
multiple currencies, I have retained only the euro-denominated units. Moreover, I have excluded funds that are 
not open-ended to ensure that the sample contains only funds that are actually open to investors. 
 
Panel A contains an overview of the sample composition and some basic characteristics of the sample.  
 
Panel B contains descriptive statistics on the observations of the funds in the sample 2007-2012.  
 
Panel A: Sample composition 
   Number (% of sample)  
  Total number of funds 332 (100%)  
  Total time points 24 quarters  
  Potential max observations 7968  
  Actual number of observations 5647  
     
  Performance fee observed 572 (10.1%)  
  No performance fee 5075 (89.9%)  
     
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of funds in the sample 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Subscription fee 5647 0.95 % 0.49 % 0.0 % 5.0 % 
Management fee 5640 1.55 % 0.74 % 0.0 % 3.3 % 
Redemption fee 5647 0.95 % 0.48 % 0.0 % 3.0 % 
AUM (€ millions) 5388          79.5 €         110.8 €             0.1 €         1 543.6 €  
Unitholders 5372 5944.553 11566.44 2 99819 
Volatility 5395 22.13 % 8.50 % 6.60 % 73.80 % 
Participation rate 572 16.70% 5.00% 10% 30% 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix of key variables  
  Alpha 
Subscr. 
fee 
Redemp. 
fee 
Mgmt. 
fee 
HWM 
dummy 
Cap 
dummy 
Positivity 
dummy Part. rate Fund age AUM 
Unit-
holders Volatility 
Alpha 1.00 
Subscription fee -0.03** 1.00 
Redemption fee -0.01 0.50*** 1.00 
Management fee -0.01 0.50*** 0.71*** 1.00 
HWM dummy 0.02 -0.09*** -0.22*** -0.19*** 1.00 
Cap dummy 0.01 0.08*** -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.03** 1.00 
Positivity dummy 0.02 -0.07*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 0.79*** 0.09*** 1.00 
Participation rate 0.01 0.05*** -0.16*** -0.11*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.60*** 1.00 
Fund age 0.01 -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.10*** 0.04*** -0.13*** -0.17*** 1.00 
AUM 0.03** 0.01 -0.02 0.04*** -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.04*** -0.07*** 0.30*** 1.00 
Unitholders 0.01 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.12*** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.10*** -0.12*** 0.15*** 0.56*** 1.00 
Volatility 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.16*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.07*** 1.00 
The table depicts the correlations between key variables utilized in this thesis. Alpha refers to the four-factor after-fee alpha calculated utilizing four explanatory portfolios. 
Subscription, redemption and management fee refer to the respective fee types on a p.a. basis acquired from Investment Research Finland. HWM Dummy (high-water mark 
dummy) takes a value of 1, if the fund rules disclose the use of a high-water mark in performance fee calculation. Cap dummy takes a value of 1, if the performance fee is 
capped to a pre-determined percentage of fund assets. Positivity dummy takes a value of 1, if the performance fee payment requires positive return for the fund for the 
performance fee to be paid out. Participation rate refers to the fraction of excess return accruing to the fund management as a performance fee. Fund age is the age of the 
fund expressed in years; AUM is the assets under management for a particular fund at a particular point in time. Unitholders refers to the number of fund unitholders at a 
particular point of time. Volatility is the annualized volatility of the fund’s returns. Stars depict the statistical significance for the alternative hypothesis that the correlation 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  33 
5.2. Performance fees in Finnish mutual funds 
Overall, based on the sample, the use of performance fees is not very common in Finnish 
mutual funds. Only 10.2% of my total observations included the use of performance fees. At 
the end of the sample period in December 2012, 12.03% of funds in the sample utilized 
performance fees. Summary of the characteristics of performance fees is provided in Table 5 
on the next page. 
However, contrasting Finland to the Nordic countries9, the use of performance fees is notably 
more frequent in Finland than in rest of Nordic countries. At the end of 2012, there were 10 
funds in Sweden, 2 funds in Denmark and 38 funds in Norway using performance fees. 
Furthermore, the use of performance fees in Finland seems to be more prevalent compared to 
the United States, where, according to Elton et al. (2003) only 108 out of a total of 6716 funds 
used incentive fees in 1999. 
The AUM of funds with performance fees is also smaller. The mean AUM over the sample 
for funds with performance fees was €59.3m, whereas for funds without performance fees the 
mean AUM was €79.5m. At the end of the sample period, the average AUM for funds with 
performance fees was smaller than for funds without performance fees, at €72.2m and 
€95.1m, respectively. This is potentially explained by the fact that a majority of funds with 
performance fees are managed by firms with lower brand awareness (such as PYN or ODIN), 
compared to larger Finnish financial institutions (e.g. Nordea and Pohjola) leading to a 
relatively lower AUM. Funds utilizing performance fees in my sample are listed in Appendix 
B. 
                                                 
9
 My original data request from Morningstar contained also Norwegian, Swedish and Danish mutual funds. This 
data is to the best extent of my knowledge exhaustive, but has not been cross-referenced against data from other 
sources and thus is not as reliable as the Finnish data. These funds were dropped from the final study due to 
country-specific reasons; Norway due to regulatory restrictions on asymmetric fees, Denmark due to very 
infrequent use of performance fees and the subsequently small sample size and Sweden due to lack of required 
data. 
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Table 5: Summary of performance fees charged by mutual funds in the sample 
Panel A describes the contractual characteristics of the performance fees charged by the 40 Finnish mutual 
funds in my sample. Participation rate refers to the portion of excess return accruing to management. High-
water mark refers to the use of a high-water mark provision in the contract. Positivity constraint limits the 
payment of performance fees only to cases where the absolute return of a fund is positive. Cap on performance 
fee limits the performance fee to a predetermined maximum percentage of AUM.  
Panel B describes the different types of hurdle rates utilized in the calculation of the performance fees in the 
funds in my sample. Single market index refers to the use of a single equity or stock index which is used as the 
reference rate. Combination of multiple indices refers to the combination of multiple indices to a single hurdle 
rate via taking arithmetic or a weighted average of the underlying indices' returns. Risk-free rate refers to the 
use of a risk-free rate (in this context, the Euribor rate as well as the TyEl, the Finnish pension rate, have been 
categorized to be risk-free rates). Fixed rate is a pre-determined fixed return number that must be beat in order 
for the performance fee to start accruing. No hurdle rate is simply a case, where the fund only needs a positive 
return for the performance fee to start accruing. 
Panel C describes the relationship between the contractual constraints utilized by a fund and the selected hurdle 
rate. Note that the sums are different from the Panel B due to the fact that a fund may contain several 
constraints (i.e. a positivity constraint and a high-watermark dummy), whereas the utilized hurdle rates can only 
be assigned to one of the pre-determined categories. 
Panel A: Funds with performance fees and their characteristics 
N Mean Max Min St. Dev. 
Participation rate 40 16.70 % 30 % 10 % 5.00 % 
High-water mark 17 
(43.3%) 
Positivity constraint 17 
(43.3%) 
Panel B: Utilized hurdle rates 
Single index Past return 
Risk-free 
rate Fixed rate No rate 
Multiple 
indices 
Number of funds 27 1 4 5 2 1 
Percentage of total 67.5 % 2.5 % 10.0 % 12.5 % 5.0 % 2.5 % 
Panel C: Relationship between characteristics and hurdle rate 
Single index Past return 
Risk-free 
rate Fixed rate 
No hurdle 
rate 
Multiple 
indices 
High-water mark 4 0 4 5 2 1 
Capped fee 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Positivity constraint 8 0 4 5 2 0 
No constraints 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Majority of the funds (67.5%) are using single index as the hurdle rate. Furthermore, the use 
of high-water marks is fairly common in fairly frequent in cases, where the hurdle rate is not a 
single index. Of the total of 17 funds using a high-water mark, 12 have hurdle rate which is 
different from a single index. Perhaps the most interesting data point of the performance fees, 
the participation rate is heavily focused at the 20% mark. As is evident in Figure 1, over half 
(23) of the 40 funds with performance fees charge a participation rate of 20%.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of participation rates in Finnish funds with performance fees 
 
Overall, the use of so-called plain vanilla performance fees is relatively infrequent. Only 15 
out of the 40 funds with performance fees do not utilize high-water marks, positivity 
constraints or fee caps. Thus, 25 or 62.5% of the funds with performance fees in my sample 
have contractual provisions that can be seen as protecting the investors’ interests and reducing 
the potential for management upside.  
When it comes to the selected hurdle rate, it is evident that a vast majority of the funds simply 
utilize a single market index. Only a handful of funds have unsuitable hurdle rates (risk-free 
rate or no hurdle rate), which, from an outsider’s perspective, do not seem to be related to the 
fund’s investment style. Consequently, their appropriateness as hurdle rates for the calculation 
of performance fees can be questioned. However, in these seven cases where the hurdle rates 
are not intuitively related to the funds’ investment style, high-water marks and positivity 
constraints are utilized, consequently protecting the investors’ interests. 
5.3. Calculation of raw returns and risk-adjusted returns 
In this section, I describe the data and methodology for calculating the raw returns for all of 
the funds in my sample as well as the risk-adjustments performed on the raw returns utilizing 
a variety of explanatory portfolios. 
5.3.1. Quarterly raw returns 
The source for the return calculations is the quarterly net asset value (NAV) data acquired 
from Morningstar. Morningstar has provided the quarterly NAVs for all of the funds in my 
sample. For the purpose of determining the risk-adjusted returns of the funds, I first calculate 
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the raw quarterly returns of all the funds in my sample. The NAVs are reported net of fees, so 
the calculated returns are net returns. These net returns are subsequently used in the 
calculation of risk-adjusted returns.  
 
,	,
 = ,
,	 − 1 
 
(1)  
The returns are calculated on a discrete basis instead of continuous compounding due to the 
fact that the returns for the explanatory portfolios used in the risk-adjustment are also 
expressed on a discrete basis. 
5.3.2. Categorization of funds for calculation of risk-adjusted returns 
In order to study the impact of performance fees on funds’ returns, a risk-adjustment to the 
calculated raw returns is required, as the differences in returns are partly attributable to 
inherent differences in investment styles of the funds. In order to achieve this, I categorize all 
of the funds in my sample to five different geographical categories. This is done in order to 
strip out the differences in returns caused by different investment styles. The funds are 
categorized into the following geographical categories: Europe, Global, Japan, APAC and 
North America.  
In order to implement the categorization, I looked at the Morningstar category and the 
prospectus-defined investment strategy of the fund and grouped the fund into one of the 
aforementioned categories. All sector-focused funds (i.e. energy or healthcare) were 
categorized into the Global portfolio as well as funds focusing on emerging markets outside 
Asia. All Asia-focused funds, regardless of country or investment focus, were included in the 
APAC category, apart from Japan.  
5.3.3. Explanatory portfolios used for risk-adjustment 
Having performed the grouping of the sample funds into the five geographical categories, I 
acquire the return data for the explanatory portfolios for calculating the risk-adjusted returns. 
The return data for the explanatory portfolios is acquired from scholar Kenneth French’s 
website, which is widely used in the calculation of risk-adjusted returns of investments. The 
raw data is on a monthly basis and has been converted to quarterly basis to make it 
comparable to the data acquired from Morningstar. 
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In order to determine a fund’s risk adjusted return, I have utilized four distinct explanatory 
portfolios denoted by Market, SMB, HML and WML, which refer to the market portfolio, 
size portfolio, value portfolio and momentum portfolio, respectively. These four factors have 
been used in previous literature for calculating the risk-adjusted returns of mutual funds (see 
e.g. Carhart, 1997)  
The market portfolio refers to a region’s value-weighted market portfolio’s return in excess 
over the 1-month Treasury rate. 
The SMB or the size portfolio refers to a portfolio mimicking the size anomaly or that small-
cap companies outperform large-cap companies. According to Kenneth French’s website, the 
SMB portfolio is constructed as follows  
SMB is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios 
for the region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios  
The HML portfolio is a portfolio mimicking the value phenomenon in which shares with low 
Market-to-Book ratios (high Book-to-Market ratios) outperform shares with high Market-to-
Book ratios (low Book-to-market ratios). The HML portfolio is constructed as follows: 
HML is the equal-weight average of the returns for the two high B/M portfolios for 
a region minus the average of the returns for the two low B/M portfolios 
The WML portfolio mimicks the momentum phenomenon, in which stock returns exhibit 
positive autocorrelation (i.e. positive stock returns tend to be followed by positive returns and 
vice versa). The WML portfolio is constructed as follows 
WML is the equal-weight average of the returns for the two winner portfolios for a 
region minus the average of the returns for the two loser portfolios 
Overview of the returns of the explanatory portfolios is depicted in Appendix C. 
5.3.4. Calculation of risk-adjusted returns 
Having acquired the quarterly raw returns for the funds and the quarterly returns of the 
explanatory portfolios, I am able to calculate the quarterly risk-adjusted return (henceforth 
also referred to as the “four-factor alpha”, “ex-post alpha”, “Jensen’s alpha” or simply 
“alpha”) for each of the observations in my sample. To do this, I utilize the 4-factor model 
originally introduced by Carhart (1997). The model includes the traditional three Fama-
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French risk factors (market, size and value) and an additional factor capturing the momentum 
anomaly.  
The risk-adjusted performance is estimated separately based on geographic categorization g 
for each fund i at time t using the following equation,  
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where ,	,
 − ,	,
, is the fund’s net return for period )* to ) in excess of the risk-
free rate.	,	,
, − ,	,
, is the return of the market portfolio in excess of the same 
risk-free rate. !",	,
,	and $%,	,
, are returns on portfolios mimicking Fama-French 
factors size and book-to-market equity. '((,,	,
, is the return of the portfolio 
mimicking the momentum strategy.10  
By estimating the equation I obtain the beta coefficients for each of the factors for each fund 
in the sample. Utilizing the estimated beta coefficients for the sample period, I acquire the 
theoretical model return for the each time period for each fund in the sample. By comparing 
the model return and the realized return for the time period, I obtain the funds’ ex post four-
factor alpha (“Jensen’s alpha”), which is a risk-adjusted return measure for all of the funds in 
the sample taking into account the differences in investment focus. A summary of the alphas 
is depicted in Table 6 below. 
                                                 
10
 The data for the three Fama-French factors has been acquired from Kenneth French’s website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
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Table 6: Estimated quarterly ex post four-factor alphas of the funds in the sample 
Category N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
APAC 494 1.02E-08 8.39 % -22.93 % 34.32 % 
Europe 3019 4.01E-08 7.75 % -56.03 % 56.26 % 
Global 1688 -9.84E-10 6.40 % -25.20 % 30.11 % 
Japan 148 9.46E-09 4.96 % -14.29 % 11.59 % 
NorthAmerica 298 2.55E-08 4.84 % -12.89 % 17.96 % 
Total 5647 2.36E-08 7.24 % -56.03 % 56.26 % 
This table summarizes the estimated four-factor alphas (risk-adjusted returns) for each of the funds in the sample 
across time estimated using equation 12. The explanatory portfolios used in the calculation of alphas are market 
portfolio (RMRF), size portfolio (SMB), value portfolio (HML) and momentum portfolio (WML).  
On average, the funds are unable to provide superior risk-adjusted returns, which is evident in 
the average alphas, which are very close to zero. The estimated minimum and maximum ex-
post alphas are rather large in absolute terms, which is to be expected due to the sample size. 
5.4. Tracking error data and calculations 
In order to calculate the tracking error of fund returns and correlation between the fund and 
the benchmark, I obtain additional data. As the data from Morningstar or Investment Research 
Finland did not include data on tracking errors or correlations, I acquired the data for these 
calculations via the Bloomberg portal, using the ISIN codes of the funds in my sample. For 
acquiring the benchmark return data, I matched the benchmark stated in the Morningstar 
data/IRF data/Fund prospectus to a specific Bloomberg ticker using Bloomberg’s search 
functionality. After having all the ticker codes for the funds and benchmarks, I acquired net 
asset value on a monthly basis for the time period of 2007-2012. Having acquired the absolute 
ending values, I calculated the monthly returns for the fund and benchmark11 in question. The 
acquisition of return data for the funds is done for the second time to ensure that the utilized 
time period is exactly the same for the fund and the benchmark. 
Unfortunately, for some of the funds, benchmark was not disclosed or utilized at all. 
Consequently, funds without a benchmark were dropped from the calculations. Moreover, for 
some of the benchmarks, the benchmark price data was not available from Bloomberg, which 
forced me to drop funds utilizing such benchmarks from the calculations. For the 
aforementioned reasons, I ended up with 238 funds, where I had return data for both the fund 
                                                 
11
 Some of the funds utilized a weighted average of several benchmarks’ returns. In these cases, I simply 
acquired the ending prices for each of the components, calculated the return for each of the component and 
utilized the prospectus-stated weights to calculate the benchmark return. For instance, the fund Eufex 
ActiveAlpha has a benchmark consisting of three components: MSCI AC Americas NR USD 33.000% + MSCI 
AC Asia NR USD 33.000% + MSCI AC Europe NR USD 34.000% 
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and the benchmark for a given time period. This is considerably smaller than my original 
sample of 332 funds. Having calculated the returns for the funds and the benchmarks, I 
calculated the annualized tracking error for the funds in the sample utilizing the following 
formula. 
 ,-./0123	4--5-	6. .. = √12 ∗ ;<=,	,
 − ">?(,	,
@ , − 1AB*  (3)  
An overview of the descriptive statistics between the total sample and for the subsample on 
which the tracking error calculations are performed is available in Appendix D. Overall, the 
funds for which benchmark data was available are larger in terms of AUM, slightly older and 
have more unitholders. These funds can thus be characterized as being more established as 
they have a longer track record and more owners. The funds with no benchmark data 
available are newer and have less unitholders. 
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6. Analysis and results 
The following analysis section is divided into four discrete parts. First, in part 6.1 I study the 
impact of the use of performance fees on mutual funds’ risk-adjusted returns as measured by 
the fund’s four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio. Next, in section 6.2, I study the impact of 
performance fees on fund managers’ risk-taking behaviour as measured by fund volatility and 
tracking errors. In section 6.3 I present my methodology for calculating the ex ante value of 
the performance fees and results of the valuation. Following the calculation of the cost of the 
fees, I compare the costs of funds with performance fees to funds without such fees in part 
6.4.  
6.1. Performance fees and fund returns 
In order to answer my first research question on the relationship between performance fees 
and fund returns, I conduct a variety of regressions to test the relationship between 
performance fees and returns, utilizing a variety of return measures. 
In the following chapters, I present my methodology and analysis for determining the impact 
of performance fees on the mutual funds’ raw and risk-adjusted returns. The regression 
equations in this section utilize a variety of return measures, including raw, non-adjusted 
quarterly returns, quarterly four-factor alphas (as calculated in part 5.3.4) and annual Sharpe 
ratios. The equations follow the work of Massa and Patgiri (2009) and Elton et al. (2003), 
with some modifications partly due to differences in research focus and partly due to data 
availability reasons. The key difference between my work and that of Massa and Patgiri 
(2009) is the inclusion of performance fee dummy as an explanatory variable and the 
omission of fund survival probability and turnover ratio due to data reasons.  
Furthermore, to control for fund-specific characteristics, I include a variety of control 
variables related to fund size and age in the regression specifications. 
6.1.1. Impact of performance fees on funds’ raw, non-risk-adjusted returns 
To determine the impact of the use of performance fees on the raw quarterly returns of mutual 
funds as calculated in part 5.3.1, I estimate the following equation,  
 
,	,
 = * + CD +  ED + F, (4)  
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where * is the intercept, CD, is a set of incentive and fee variables for fund i at time t, ED,	 is 
a set of control variables for fund i at time t and F, is the error term. The results of the 
regression are specified in Table 7.  
Table 7: Raw quarterly returns and fund characteristics 
Dependent variable Fund's raw quarterly net return 
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model description No controls Style dummies Time dummies Time+style 
Performance fee dummy 2.556*** 2.985*** 0.823** 0.908*** 
(3.94) (4.41) (2.45) (2.89) 
Net subscriptions YTD 0.0509*** 0.0476*** 0.0215*** 0.0205*** 
(5.40) (5.29) (3.35) (3.33) 
Unitholders -0.000100*** -0.000103*** -0.0000121 -0.0000165 
(-3.29) (-3.53) (-1.19) (-1.55) 
AUM 0.0134*** 0.0156*** 0.00165 0.00229 
(3.69) (3.43) (1.35) (1.61) 
Fund age 0.273*** 0.264*** 0.0196 0.0239 
(5.29) (5.27) (1.00) (1.18) 
Lagged volatility 0.633*** 0.656*** 0.140*** 0.156*** 
(24.95) (24.47) (5.83) (5.75) 
Constant -17.23*** -18.40*** -0.488 -0.804 
(-24.40) (-18.60) (-0.80) (-1.13) 
Observations 5647 5647 5647 5647 
R-Squared 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.75 
The model presents the estimates of a random effects panel regression where the fund's quarterly raw return 
is the explanatory variable. Model (1) refers to a specification where no dummies have been used to control 
for time or category effects. Model (2) refers to a specification, where I have included (unreported) category 
dummies to control for differences in investment styles. Model (3) includes quarterly time dummies to 
control for time effects. Model (4) contains both dummies. Performance fee dummy gets a value of 1, if the 
fund has a performance fee in place. Net subscriptions YTD are inflows (outflows) in €m into the fund. 
Unitholders refer to number of people holding fund at time t. AUM is the assets under management. Fund 
age is expressed in years. Lagged volatility is the prior period annualized volatility. Robust standard errors 
have been used in the regression. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
 
Even while controlling for time-specific effects and lagged volatility, the use of performance 
fees is associated with higher raw net returns. When controlling for differences in both time 
and investment style the impact of a performance fee is 90.8 basis points per quarter. As 
expected, also lagged volatility is highly significant, indicating that higher absolute risk-levels 
lead to higher returns. As expected, the impact of lagged volatility is highly significant in all 
of the specifications. Net subscriptions YTD are also highly significant, indicating that higher 
returns are associated with higher inflows. Assets under management and fund age are 
insignificant, implying that larger or older funds do not outperform. Similar results hold even 
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while including current period volatility and lagged raw return as explanatory variables 
(unreported). Overall, the use of performance fees is positively associated with unadjusted 
quarterly raw returns, with a highly significant coefficient. 
6.1.2. Impact of performance fees on fund’s four-factor alpha 
Having calculated the ex post four-factor alpha, as described in part 5.3.4, I can perform 
regressions utilizing the ex post four-factor alpha as the dependent variable and estimate the 
following equation 
 
, = * + CD +  ED + F, 
 
(5)  
where variables are defined as previously, apart from,, which is the four-factor alpha 
for each fund at observation period t. The results of the regression are depicted in Table 8.  
Table 8: After-fee four-factor alphas and fund characteristics 
Dependent variable Fund's quarterly after-fee four-factor alpha 
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model description No controls Style dummies Time dummies Time+style 
Performance fee dummy 0.828** 0.984*** 0.675** 0.795*** 
(2.52) (2.98) (2.25) (2.64) 
Net subscriptions YTD 0.0166*** 0.0155*** 0.0150*** 0.0144*** 
(3.35) (3.24) (2.99) (2.94) 
Unitholders -0.0000228* -0.0000227** -0.0000141 -0.0000150 
(-1.95) (-1.98) (-1.45) (-1.50) 
AUM 0.00269** 0.00341** 0.00180* 0.00231* 
(2.11) (2.31) (1.76) (1.96) 
Fund age 0.0424** 0.0384* 0.0229 0.0209 
(2.05) (1.80) (1.23) (1.06) 
Lagged volatility (-1) 0.164*** 0.173*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 
(9.99) (10.31) (4.30) (4.60) 
Constant -4.277*** -4.810*** -3.504*** -4.105*** 
(-10.21) (-9.73) (-5.74) (-5.88) 
Observations 5647 5647 5647 5647 
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.27 
The model presents the estimates of a random effects panel regression where the fund's quarterly four-factor 
alpha is the dependent variable. Model (1) refers to a specification where no dummies have been used to 
control for time or category effects. Model (2) refers to a specification, where I have included (unreported) 
category dummies to control for differences in investment styles. Model (3) includes time dummies to 
control for time effects. Model (4) contains both dummies. Performance fee dummy gets a value of 1, if the 
fund has a performance fee in place. Net subscriptions YTD are inflows (outflows) in €m into the fund. 
Unitholders refer to number of people holding fund at time t. AUM is the assets under management. Fund 
age is expressed in years. Lagged volatility is the prior period annualized volatility. Robust standard errors 
have been used in the regression. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
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Despite the risk-adjustment made based on inherent differences in funds’ investment styles, 
the impact of performance fees on risk-adjusted returns is similar as their impact on raw 
returns. Performance fee dummy is highly significant and is associated with a 79.5 basis point 
increase in quarterly alpha. These findings are also in line with Massa and Patgiri (2009), who 
find that higher contractual incentives increase risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, 
Ackermann et al. (2002) find that incentive fees have a strong positive impact on risk-
adjusted return. Thus, overall, my results are in line with the (scarce) existing literature, 
giving support to my first hypothesis that higher contractual incentives are associated with 
superior performance. 
The magnitude of the impact of the incentives is also roughly in line with previous literature. 
My finding of excess return of 79.5 basis points per quarter (or 318 basis points p.a.) is in line 
with Massa and Patgiri (2009), who, albeit using a slightly different methodology, find that 
top-incentive quintile outperforms the bottom quintile by 2.70% p.a. Furthermore, Golec 
(1988) finds that funds with incentive fees exhibit on average 1.62% higher alphas on an 
annual basis. 
Fund age does not have any impact on a fund’s risk-adjusted return. In other words, older or 
younger funds do not vary in terms of their return-producing capabilities. This observation is 
in contrast with the study of Massa and Patgiri (2009), who find a significant relationship 
between fund age and risk-adjusted returns. However, the absolute magnitude of their 
coefficient, despite its statistical significance, is rather small. However, in the study of 
Ackermann et al. (2002), fund age never significantly impacts a fund’s return. My 
observations are in line with these findings. 
Overall, my results imply a positive association between the use of performance fees and ex 
post alpha, even while controlling for time-specific factors and fund volatility.  
6.1.3. Impact of performance fees on a fund’s Sharpe ratio 
To control for any possible inappropriate categorisations in part 5.3.2 and consequently 
inaccurate risk-adjusted alphas, I also utilize the Sharpe ratio as a measure of risk-adjusted 
performance. By utilizing the Sharpe ratio as a measure of risk-adjusted performance, I am 
able to avoid any assumptions about appropriate explanatory portfolios for the funds in the 
sample. The Sharpe ratio has been directly acquired from IRF data and it is stated on a yearly 
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basis. Consequently, the number of observations is lower than in previous sections, where the 
used data was quarterly. The results of the regression are reported in Table 9.  
Again, regardless of the regression equation specification, the coefficient for the performance 
fee dummy is significant in three out of four different model specifications. Depending on the 
utilized control variables, the impact of performance fees is 13.3-31.3 basis points per unit of 
volatility. Thus, ceteris paribus, a fund with a 20% annual volatility with a performance fee 
would outperform a similar fund without a performance fee by at least 2.66% p.a., which is in 
line with the results in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2., where raw return and four-factor alpha were 
used. 
Table 9: Annual Sharpe ratio and fund characteristics 
Dependent variable Annual Sharpe ratio 
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model description No controls Style dummies Time dummies Time+style 
Performance fee dummy 0.313*** 0.296*** 0.169* 0.133 
(2.59) (2.62) (1.69) (1.48) 
Net subscriptions YTD 0.00742*** 0.00711*** 0.00325*** 0.00313*** 
(6.02) (6.00) (3.98) (3.96) 
Unitholders -0.00000923*** -0.0000113*** -0.00000137 -0.00000339** 
(-2.95) (-3.54) (-0.85) (-2.03) 
AUM 0.00150** 0.00167** 0.000386 0.000463 
(2.06) (2.08) (1.27) (1.49) 
Fund age 0.0116* 0.0119* -0.00617 -0.00507 
(1.76) (1.78) (-1.37) (-1.12) 
Lagged volatility (-1) 0.0420*** 0.0430*** 0.0109*** 0.00960** 
(11.88) (11.63) (2.59) (2.10) 
Constant -0.809*** -0.951*** 0.847*** 0.737*** 
(-8.08) (-6.93) (8.12) (6.20) 
Observations 1327 1327 1327 1327 
R-Squared 0.13 0.14 0.75 0.75 
The model presents the estimates of a random effects panel regression where the fund's annual Sharpe ratio 
is the dependent variable. Model (1) refers to a specification where no dummies have been used to control 
for time or category effects. Model (2) refers to a specification, where I have included (unreported) category 
dummies to control for differences in investment styles. Model (3) includes time dummies to control for 
time effects. Model (4) contains both dummies. Performance fee dummy gets a value of 1, if the fund has a 
performance fee in place. Net subscriptions YTD are inflows (outflows) in €m into the fund. Unitholders 
refer to number of people holding fund at time t. AUM is the assets under management. Fund age is 
expressed in years. Lagged volatility is the prior period annualized volatility. Robust standard errors have 
been used in the regression. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
6.1.4. Summary of the impact of performance fees on funds’ risk-adjusted return 
Overall, based on the regressions, performance fees seem to be associated with both higher 
raw returns as well as risk-adjusted returns. My results are broadly in line with existing 
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research (see Agarwal et al., 2009; Elton et al., 2003; Golec, 1988 and Massa and Patgiri, 
2009) which suggests that higher contractual incentives are associated with better 
performance. 
The results are robust across different model specifications and different dependent variables, 
which increases the confidence in my results. Out of a total of 12 models (4 different 
specifications with 3 different dependent variables), the coefficient for the performance fee 
dummy is significant in eleven cases. As expected, lagged volatility has a significant impact 
on the performance of a fund due to the positive relationship between risk and expected 
return. 
6.2. Performance fees and fund management behaviour 
As discussed, performance fees are effectively a spread option held by the management and 
written by the investors on the excess return of the fund. The spread option increases in value 
when either the volatility of the fund increases or the correlation between the fund returns and 
the benchmark returns decreases. In line with my second research question, in this section I 
study the impact of performance fees on a variety of risk-measures to determine whether the 
use of performance fees is associated with higher absolute and/or active risk. 
Due to the option-like nature of the performance compensation, funds with performance fees 
theoretically have a larger incentive to take risk. As Drago et al. (2005) and Margrabe (1978) 
note, the volatility of a spread option is defined as  
 GH = IG − 2J, GG + G   (6)  
As the vega, or the first derivative of option value with regards to volatility, of the long spread 
option is positive, increasing the volatility GH of the spread option will increase the value of 
the option. This can be achieved either via increasing the absolute volatility of the fund 
portfolio (G ) by for example increasing leverage or decreasing the correlation with the 
benchmark (J, ). Both of these actions will increase the deviation of the fund’s returns 
around the benchmark and consequently increase the probability of the performance fee 
option ending in the money. Thus, based on the aforementioned reasoning, I test statistically 
both whether funds with performance fees exhibit absolute higher risk levels (i.e. is G  on 
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average higher) and whether such funds exhibit higher active risk levels (i.e. is the tracking 
error of the fund higher) 
6.2.1. Performance fees and volatility levels 
With regards to the absolute risk levels, I estimate the impact of contractual incentives on the 
absolute risk of a fund by the equation 
 
GD, = * + *CD, + ED, + FD, (7)  
where GD, is the annualized volatility of returns for fund i at time t, CD, is a dummy for the use 
of performance fee and ED, is a set of control variables. As previously, my specification is for 
most part following the methodology of Massa and Patgiri (2009) with the difference that I 
am using a performance fee dummy as an explanatory variable instead of the Coles’ incentive 
rate.  
The model specification for the regressions is similar as in part 6.1. However, in this section, I 
have also included fees (subscription, redemption, management) as explanatory variables to 
test for the impact of fees on the volatility of funds in the sample. These were excluded from 
the return regressions due to the fact that all used return measures were based on after-fee 
returns. Consequently, including the fees in the return regressions would have had no 
economic interpretation. 
The results of the regression, depicted in Table 10, are surprising. In the first two model 
specifications, the impact of performance fee on volatility is negative. However, when 
controlling for time effects, which often have a significant impact on volatility, the effect of 
performance fees on volatility is not significant. As expected, the volatility of the previous 
period has quite a large impact on the volatility of the subsequent period. Interestingly, fund 
age has a positive impact on volatility, implying that older funds take slightly higher risk, 
when controlling for time effects. The R-squared for the models is relatively large due to the 
inclusion of lagged volatility and time dummies, which explain most of the variation in 
volatility. Thus, based on the empirical findings, funds with performance fees do not seem to 
exhibit higher absolute risk levels compared to their peers. The empirical evidence does not 
support the hypothesis that funds with performance fees take higher risk than normal funds.  
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The insignificance of the performance fee dummy is in contrast to the study of Massa and 
Patgiri (2009), who find that higher contractual incentives are associated with higher risk-
taking, albeit using a different definition of incentives. However, my results are in line with 
the findings of Gehrig et al. (2008), who find, albeit using a survey-based methodology, that 
there is little evidence of bonus payments inducing risk-taking. With respect to the theoretical 
literature, my empirical results provide support to Carpenter (2000) who finds that option-like 
compensation does not lead to strictly higher risk seeking.  
Interestingly, the coefficient for unitholders is highly significant, implying that funds with a 
larger number of subscribers have larger volatility levels. However, the coefficient for AUM 
is negative and significant, implying that an increase in AUM would result in a decrease in 
volatility. Fund age has a marginal but significant impact on volatility, implying that older 
funds are taking more absolute risk.  
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Table 10: Use of performance fees and mutual fund volatility 
Dependent variable Fund i's annualized quarterly volatility at time t 
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model description No controls Style dummies Time dummies Time+style 
Performance fee dummy -0.431** -0.538*** 0.141 0.0852 
(-2.30) (-2.72) (1.45) (0.90) 
Subscription fee 0.123 0.162 -0.0499 -0.0393 
(0.73) (0.89) (-0.67) (-0.48) 
Redemption fee -0.198 -0.114 -0.0671 -0.0175 
(-1.09) (-0.59) (-0.83) (-0.20) 
Management fee 0.249** 0.154 0.165*** 0.119** 
(2.12) (1.27) (3.21) (2.27) 
Net subscriptions YTD -0.0161*** -0.0152*** -0.00612*** -0.00581*** 
(-6.06) (-5.62) (-3.69) (-3.42) 
Unitholders 0.0000216** 0.0000227*** 0.0000165*** 0.0000177*** 
(2.48) (2.61) (2.93) (3.02) 
AUM -0.00304*** -0.00358*** -0.00319*** -0.00348*** 
(-2.68) (-2.58) (-3.20) (-2.98) 
Fund age -0.0617*** -0.0592*** 0.0217*** 0.0219*** 
(-4.28) (-4.25) (2.79) (2.86) 
Lagged volatility 0.850*** 0.844*** 0.944*** 0.937*** 
(144.72) (137.10) (134.20) (121.91) 
Constant 3.776*** 4.290*** -0.922*** -0.528** 
(15.19) (13.75) (-5.02) (-2.50) 
Observations 4842 4842 4842 4842 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.81 0.81 
This table describes the results of a regression of a mutual fund's annualized volatility at time t on a set of 
explanatory variables. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors have been used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity. Model (1) refers to a specification where no dummies have been used to 
control for time or category effects. Model (2) refers to a specification, where I have included (unreported) 
category dummies to control for differences in investment styles. Model (3) includes time dummies to 
control for time effects. Model (4) contains both dummies. . Performance fee dummy gets a value of 1, if the 
fund has a performance fee in place. Net subscriptions YTD are inflows (outflows) in €m into the fund. 
Unitholders refer to number of people holding fund at time t. AUM is the assets under management. Fund 
age is expressed in years. Lagged volatility is the prior period annualized volatility. Robust standard errors 
have been used in the regression. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
 
6.2.2. Differences in tracking error 
As shown by Chen and Pennacchi (2009), for particular compensation types, a fund manager 
will increase the fund’s tracking error as its relative performance declines. In general, a fund 
manager under incentive compensation relative to a benchmark will have an incentive to 
increase the active risk of her portfolio, i.e. deviate more from the benchmark. This effect is 
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exacerbated when the fund is underperforming the benchmark, as the fund manager will have 
incentives to deviate from the benchmark to get back in-the-money in terms of his option 
position. The deviation from the benchmark is measured by tracking error, which is the 
standard deviation of the difference in returns between the fund and the benchmark: 
 ,-./0123	4--5- = ;<=, − ">?(,@ , − 1AB*  (8)  
Thus, whereas in part 6.2.1 I test whether performance fees have an impact on the absolute 
risk of the fund, in this part I empirically test whether performance fees have an impact on the 
active risk of a fund. I empirically test whether there is a difference between the tracking 
errors of performance-fee funds and non-performance fee funds.12 The expectation based on 
theoretical literature is that funds with performance fees are more aggressive in taking active 
risk by deviating from the benchmark more. To test for this, I compare the average tracking 
errors for funds with performance fees and without. The results are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Differences in tracking errors 
The table describes the annualized tracking errors for the funds in the sample. The tracking errors are calculated 
as the standard deviation of the difference in returns of the fund and the benchmark. The data for the 
calculations has been gathered manually from Bloomberg. To ensure an adequate calculation horizon, the 
tracking errors have been calculated utilizing differences in returns between March 2007 and December 2012. 
The lower part of the table describes the results of a statistical test for a significant difference in the mean 
tracking errors between funds with performance fees and without performance fees.  
n Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
No performance fee 219 9.55 % 4.58 % 0.00 % 23.85 % 
Performance fee 19 13.64 % 8.68 % 4.10 % 39.83 % 
Total 238 10.02 % 5.36 % 0.00 % 39.83 % 
Difference -4.09 % 
Degrees of freedom 236 
t-value -3.97 
p-value (difference <0) <0.001 
              
Interestingly, based on the results, it seems that funds with performance fees indeed have, on 
average, higher tracking errors than funds without performance fees. The results are highly 
significant. Contrasting this with my findings in the previous section and previous literature, it 
seems that performance fees are associated with higher active risk-taking in the sense that 
                                                 
12
 As stated in part 1.4, the tracking error calculations have been done individually for each fund and the 
corresponding benchmark and are subject to additional data availability restrictions. 
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funds deviate more from their prospectus-stated benchmarks. However, in terms of absolute 
risk as measured by the volatility of the funds, funds with performance fees do not take more 
risk, which was observed in part 6.2.1. 
6.2.3. Summary of performance fees and fund management behaviour 
Previous theoretical literature argues that performance fees drive risk-taking, as higher 
volatility and/or deviation from the benchmark increases the value of the performance fee 
option, albeit in the current period. Moreover, the risk-taking has also been observed 
empirically. My results give support to the claim that performance fees are indeed associated 
with higher active risk-taking as measured by the tracking error. However, based on my 
results, there is no support to the hypothesis mentioned in previous literature that performance 
fees drive absolute risk-taking as measured by volatility. The latter finding is potentially 
explained by the fact that in my sample and in Finnish mutual funds in general, performance 
fees are often associated with contractual mechanisms such as high-water marks that reduce 
the incentive for “putting it all on black”.  Furthermore, as discussed, an increase in current 
period volatility may have an adverse impact on the value of the performance fee in the 
subsequent periods and thus. 
6.3. Valuation of the performance fee option 
In this section, I elaborate on the general principles behind the valuation of the performance 
fee option and present the results of my valuation utilizing simulation and the Margrabe 
(1978) model for the 40 Finnish mutual funds in my sample charging performance fees. 
6.3.1. Introduction to the valuation of the performance fee 
As noted by Drago et al. (2005), for a single unit of managed capital, the compensation 
payable to the fund management p.a. is 
 
,C = .* ∗ KL + .L.M=,	,
 − ">?(,	,
 − N; 0@ ∗ KL (9)  
where TC is total compensation, .* is a factor for management, redemption and subscription 
fees, which are usually based on a fixed percentage of AUM, . is the participation rate,  is the return of the fund for the time period from )* to ), ">?( is the return 
(hurdle rate) for the benchmark for the same period and N is the minimum excess return that 
needs to be earned over the hurdle rate before the performance fee starts accruing. Note that in 
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the formula the performance fee is also paid for excess returns when the absolute return is 
negative. In some legislations (e.g. Italy), performance fee can only be paid out when the 
absolute return of the fund is positive (i.e. ,	,
 > 0). . In this case, a dummy variable d 
needs to be added. The value for d is 1 when ,	,
 > 0 and 0 when  ,	,
 < 0. 
 
,C = .* ∗ KL + .SL.M=,	,
 − ">?(,	,
 − N; 0@ ∗ KL (10) 
Interestingly, in the notation L.M(,	,
 − ">?(,	,
 − N; 0) we can recognize the 
typical payoff of an option. In this case, the option can be seen as a long position in the 
underlying fund and as a short position in the underlying benchmark. 
In addition to positivity constraints, one additional constraint on the payment of performance 
fees is the so-called high-water mark. High-water marks are a contractual mechanism 
restricting the payment of performance fees, if the value of the fund is below some historical 
value. Thus, the high-water marks essentially force the fund to recoup any losses between 
current value and historical high value, before the performance fee can be paid out. Overall, 
the use of some kind of high-water marks is rather common in Finnish mutual funds, with 
46% of the funds having such provisions. The use of the high-water mark is illustrated in 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Illustration of the use of high-water marks 
In the example below, the high-water mark (HWM) is set at 100, which is the NAV of the fund at year 1. The 
high-water mark needs to be reached before the performance fee starts accruing. Thus, the fund can start 
charging the performance fee only in year 4, when its NAV is back at 100. However, if there were no high-water 
mark, the fund could start charging performance fees already after year 2 on returns that are actually just 
recouping earlier losses. 
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Expanding the aforementioned notation, total manager compensation with the high-water 
mark is  
 
,C = .* ∗ KL + .4L.M(,	,
 − ">?(,	,
 − N; 0) (11) 
where e is a dummy variable, which gets a value of 1 when NAVWXYZ,[
 > NAV\]^ and a 
value of 0 when NAVWXYZ,[
 < NAV\]^.  
Based on equations (9), (10) and (11), there are three main types of performance fee options: 
pure, “plain vanilla”, fee; fee with positivity constraint and a fee with a high-water mark. The 
benchmark return ">?(,	,
 can also consist of a fixed rate instead of the rate of return 
on a benchmark portfolio. In some cases, even the risk-free rate (12-month euribor) is used as 
the benchmark rate. 
Regardless of the details of the performance fee provision, all of the formulas above contain 
an option-like compensation component; if the return of the underlying (fund portfolio) 
exceeds that of the benchmark, the fund manager is paid a certain fraction of the excess part. 
Otherwise the payoff from the option component is zero and the management is compensated 
only based on the fixed component .* ∗ KL. 
As discussed in various papers (e.g. Drago et al., 2005; Elton et al., 2003 and Kritzman, 
1987), performance fees can be seen as a type of spread option, or the option to exchange one 
asset for another. Consequently, option-valuation techniques may be utilized to attempt to 
arrive at a monetary value for the performance fee option, albeit with some limitations (see 
Drago et al., 2005; Margrabe, 1978 and Wilmott, 2007). 
The dollar value of the spread option essentially depends on five factors: (1) the difference 
between the standard deviation of the portfolio and the benchmark, (2) the correlation 
between the benchmark and the portfolio, (3) the value of assets under management, (4) the 
management’s participation rate and (5) the performance measurement period. Interestingly, 
via their investment decisions, the management has direct control over the first two factors. 
The fund management can increase the difference between the standard deviation of the 
portfolio and the benchmark via higher risk-taking by increasing leverage. The management 
also has the potential to take more active risk by deviating more from the benchmark, 
consequently reducing correlation. As a consequence, a moral hazard dilemma arises: the 
management can increase the value of their option via decisions that are not optimal from an 
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investor’s point of view (Kritzman, 1987). This observation is also suggested by Huang et al. 
(2011) who note that if fund managers are evaluated on their performance relative to a 
benchmark, they are incentivized to increase the standard deviation of the tracking error13. 
The payoff of the performance fee with a participation rate of _ to the management in the 
most basic case is 
 
L.M=,	,
 − ">?(,	,
 − N; 0@ ∗ KL ∗ _ (12) 
If the strike K (or required excess return over benchmark) is zero, the option can be seen as 
option to exchange one asset for another14. Margrabe (1978) provides a valuation formula for 
such options, if the strike is zero, even if the two assets are not exchanged in a 1-to-1 ratio. 
In a general case for the spread option, where the holder has a right to exchange one asset to 
another, in some ratio, the payoff for the contract at expiry is, where 
 L.M(`a − ` a , 0) (13) 
` and	`  are constants, a is the price of asset 1 at expiration, a  is the price of asset 2 at 
expiration. 
As introduced originally by Margrabe (1978) and further explained by Wilmott (2007), the 
value for such an option is 
 (a, a , )) = `a4bc
(Ab)(S) − ` a 4bcd(Ab)(S ) (14) 
                                                 
13
 There are, however, a few caveats to this argument. As noted by Drago, Lazzari, and Navone (2005), there are 
indirect effects working in an opposite direction. Firstly, the flow-performance relationship (see e.g. Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) means that poorly-performing managers will face outflows, meaning lower assets under 
management, which will mean a lower dollar management fee. An increase in fund volatility increases the 
probability of poor performance and thus increases the probability of lower compensation from annual 
management fees for the manager. Secondly, the above argumentation on tracking error maximization implicitly 
assumes that managers maximize their single-period wealth. However, in reality (see e.g. (Goldman and Slezak, 
2003) portfolio management involves multiple time periods and career concerns of mutual fund managers play a 
role in portfolio management decisions (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).Thus, despite the existence of performance 
fees and the consequent risk-taking incentive, managers also take their future income into account and adjust 
their risk-taking. Simply put, managers don’t want to get fired and lose their income in subsequent periods. 
14
 To illustrate the idea behind the exchange option, one may think of the following example. At the beginning of 
a period, both the mutual fund and the benchmark have prices of 100 per unit. The mutual fund manager’s 
participation rate on excess return is 20% (_). At the end of the evaluation period, the value of the mutual fund 
investment is 120, whereas the value for the benchmark is still 100. The payoff to the manager is (120-
100)*20%=4 units of capital. In the abovementioned option valuation framework, we can think of the manager 
being able to sell	_units of the benchmark (essentially having a put on the benchmark) for Φ unit of the mutual 
fund (essentially having a call on the portfolio) in the transaction. Thus, in the context of option valuation, it is 
simplest to assume that the assets are exchanged on a fixed basis (i.e. ` = ` ) and that the option value is 
simply multiplied by the participation rate _ 
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where 
 
S = ln h
`a` a i + j − j + GH 2  (, − ))GH√Ab  S = S − GH√, − )	 
(15) 
and  
 GH = IG − 2J, GG + G   (16) 
where G  is the variance of the returns of asset 1 (fund portfolio), G   is the variance of the 
returns of asset 2 (benchmark) and J,  is the correlation between the returns of the two 
assets.  
However, in this context, we are able to make a few simplifications. Firstly, the performance 
fee option (assuming no high-water marks) is based on relative performance, i.e. how much 
the fund portfolio outperforms the benchmark instead of actual absolute values, which play no 
role in this context. This implies that the beginning values for the measurement period need to 
be the same for the option valuation (i.e. a = a ) to ensure that relative performance is 
captured instead of absolute price differences. Thus, at the start of the measurement period, 
the option is effectively at-the-money, assuming no high-water marks.  
Furthermore, the sample contains only growth funds, in which dividends are reinvested, 
increasing NAV, which means that we do not have to subtract the present value of the 
dividends. In order to have a comparable benchmark, I have utilized the total return 
benchmarks, when applicable. Therefore, the impact of dividends need not be taken into 
account as they are included in the price developments.  
Moreover, in this case, the management is able to exchange _ units (participation rate) of the 
benchmark portfolio to _ units of the fund portfolio so that the exchange rate is fixed 
and	` = ` . The option valuation formula is simplified to 
 (a, a , )) = a(4b(Ab)(S) − 4b(Ab)(S )) (17) 
where 
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S = ln(a) + 
GH 2  (, − ))GH√Ab , and	 S = S − GH√, − )	 
(18) 
The overall monetary value of the option to the management as a percentage of fund assets, 
taking into account the participation rate (implicitly assuming S=100), is 
 
m'(>		'nD' = 	_	(a, a , )) = _	a(4b(Ab)(S) − 4b(Ab)(S )) (19) 
However, the valuation formula in equation 19 is only applicable in cases without positivity 
constraints or high-water marks. For more exotic cases, finding a similar closed-form solution 
is impossible (Drago et al. (2005) and consequently numerical methods such as the Monte 
Carlo simulation are required. Due to the contractual characteristics of the majority of the 
funds in my sample, I utilize a Monte Carlo simulation to arrive at the monetary value for the 
performance fees. When applicable, I utilize the Margrabe (1978) model alongside the Monte 
Carlo simulation to verify the results of the simulation. Regardless of the valuation 
methodology, same assumptions (volatility, correlation and calculation period length) are 
utilized. 
6.3.2. Conducting the simulation-based valuation of performance fees 
In order to determine the theoretical ex ante value of the performance fees in the sample, I 
conduct a Monte Carlo simulation with 10 000 iterations per time node to determine price 
paths for both the fund and the benchmark. The value for the performance fee is calculated as 
of the beginning of year 2013. In the following section, I describe the methodology behind the 
simulation and mechanics behind calculating potential payoffs from the performance fees. 
The simulations are conducted for each of the 40 funds in the sample separately, with the 
payoff criteria determined based on the description of the performance fee in the fund’s KIID 
and/or rules. 
6.3.2.1 Simulation of fund and benchmark price paths 
To calculate the payoffs from the performance fee option, I simulate the correlated price paths 
of the fund in question and its corresponding benchmark.  
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The number of nodes in each price path depends on the per annum frequency a performance 
fee is charged. For instance, for a fund charging the performance fee on a monthly basis, I 
simulate the price paths for the fund and benchmark with 12 nodes, where the payoff is 
determined. The number of time nodes in a year is denoted by 2. 
Utilizing Stata’s drawnorm function, I draw 2 times 10 000 correlated standard normal 
variables for each node, where the specified correlation is the correlation between the fund’s 
and the benchmark’s returns. These random variables are denoted as , and ">?(, for the fund and the benchmark at time node ), respectively. The price paths 
for the fund and the benchmark are generated using the following equations, respectively, 
 
o-1/4, = o-1/4,b ∗ (1 + - ∗ Δ) + G ∗ √Δ) ∗ ,) 
 
(20) 
 
o-1/4">(, = o-1/4">?(,b ∗ (1 + - ∗ q) + G"( ∗ √q) ∗ "(,)		 (21) 
where Δ is the length of time in years between time nodes (i.e. 1/12 for monthly 
observations), Gr(	and	G are the annualized volatilities of the fund and the 
benchmark, respectively. The used volatilities are calculated from observations from the 
entire sample period. 
The risk-free rate - is assumed to be the drift for both the fund and the benchmark. The 
reason behind using risk-free rate as the constant drift for the assets is that the option 
valuation is done under risk neutrality, where all assets are assumed to grow at the risk-free 
rate (Wilmott, 2007) For the risk-free rate, I’ve used 0.54%, which was the 12-month euribor 
rate at the beginning of 2013. For cases, where the payoff is determined relative to a fixed 
hurdle rate, the simulation of price paths is done only for the fund. 
Note that for exhaustiveness, the valuation is done also for obsolete funds. In these cases, I’ve 
used the same risk-free rate for comparability. The key parameters (correlation and volatility) 
are calculated using return history up to the point of obsoleteness. 
6.3.2.1 Calculation of payoffs from the performance fee option 
Having generated the price paths for the fund and the benchmark, I am able to determine the 
payoff from the performance fee option at each time node, subject to restrictions such as high-
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water-marks and positivity constraints. These constraints have been acquired from individual 
KIID and rules.  
As noted in part 3.3 with respect to the compliance of Finnish funds to the IOSCO guidelines, 
the disclosure of the actual mechanics behind the calculation of performance fee in the fund 
rules and KIID is at times fairly ambiguous and difficult to understand. Thus, at times, I am 
forced to make assumptions some of the factors on the calculation methodology. These key 
assumptions are listed in Appendix F. along with any deviations in calculation methodology. 
Furthermore, for transparency, all of the Stata command and log files for the valuation are 
available online for the interested reader.15 
The value of the performance fees are calculated as of the beginning of 2013 for all funds in 
the sample, including obsolete funds.16 In cases, where high-water marks are used, I’ve 
calculated the value of the performance fee both using the real high-water mark obtained from 
the fund’s price history, when available and a theoretical high-water mark, which is set at the 
value of the fund at the beginning of the calculation period.  
For comparability of results, I calculate the payoffs from the performance fee option on a 
yearly basis and discount them back to present using the risk-free rate as the discount rate. 
6.3.3. Results of the valuation of performance fees 
Summary results of the valuation are available in Table 12 below. Overall, the performance 
fees represent a potentially significant cost component for the retail investors. On average, the 
ex ante value of the performance fee for the funds in the sample is 135 basis points, which 
represents a large cost relative to the other, fixed fees. 
                                                 
15
 Data available at http://bit.ly/Performance_Fee_Valuation_Files 
16
 I opted to conduct the calculation for the same time point to have as comparable results as possible. 
Practically, the choice of time to conduct the valuation only impacts the end result, if there are high-water marks 
in force, which vary over time. Furthermore, due to the nature of the spread options such as the performance fee, 
the risk-free rate does not impact the end result (Hull, 2010). 
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Table 12: Ex ante value of the performance fees of Finnish mutual funds 
Characteristics of the calculated ex ante values of the performance fees 
Hurdle rate n Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
Single index 26 1.32 % 1.16 % 4.84 % 0.02 % 1.03 % 
Risk-free rate 4 0.79 % 0.60 % 1.96 % 0.01 % 0.87 % 
Past return 2 0.65 % 0.65 % 0.81 % 0.49 % 0.23 % 
No rate 2 2.30 % 2.30 % 3.28 % 1.32 % 1.39 % 
Multiple indices 1 1.94 % 1.94 % 1.94 % 1.94 % N/A 
Fixed rate 5 1.72 % 1.66 % 2.74 % 0.49 % 0.97 % 
Total 40 1.35 % 1.16 % 4.84 % 0.01 % 1.01 % 
The table lists the summary results of the simulation-based valuation for each of the 40 funds in the sample 
charging performance fees. The values are calculated based on 10 000 iterations for each time point the 
performance fee can be charged per year. 
Overall, the most surprising finding is the relatively low value of the performance fee for 
funds utilizing risk-free rate as their benchmark variable. However, this is explained by the 
fact that the funds in question have high-water mark restrictions in force. The high-water 
marks for the funds in question are at times well above the beginning value of the fund, 
effectively making the performance fee option far out-the-money. 
The cumulative distribution of the ex ante fees is presented in Figure 3 below. Majority of the 
performance fees in the sample are between 0.5% and 2%. Extreme values over 3% are 
relatively rare in the sample and primarily caused by low correlation between the fund in 
question and its corresponding benchmark. 
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of performance fees’ ex ante values 
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6.3.4. Sensitivity of results to changes in key parameters 
As stated previously, the simulated values of the performance fees are highly sensitive to 
changes in the assumed correlation between the fund and the benchmark and the volatilities of 
the fund and the benchmark. To test for the sensitivity of my results to changes in these 
parameters, I’ve conducted sensitivity analyses similar to those of Drago et al. (2005) 
The simulated values of the performance fees are highly sensitive to changes in correlation 
and volatility. To test for the sensitivities, I have conducted various sensitivity analyses for 
different types of funds. Overview of these tests is available in Figure 4 below. More detailed 
results of these sensitivity analyses are available in Appendix E. 
Figure 4: Sensitivity of fee values to changes in correlation and volatility 
The figures below illustrate the sensitivities of the calculated ex ante value of the performance fee. In the first 
graph, I have assumed 20% participation rate, 21% fund volatility, risk-free rate of 0.54%, a calculation period 
of 1 year and utilized 10 000 simulations. The hypothetical fund in this example does not utilize high-water 
marks, positivity constraints or other limitations. In the second graph, I test for the impact of changes in fund 
volatility on the ex ante value under same assumptions with an assumed correlation of 0.8 
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6.4. Performance fees in relation to other fund fees 
As noted above, the value of the performance fees as a percentage of total assets ranges 
considerably from 0.01% to 4.84%, depending on the characteristics of each performance fee. 
A natural follow-up question is whether funds with performance fees charge lower other fees 
(subscription fee, management fee, and redemption fee) than funds without performance fees. 
In other words, are investors able to get a discount from other fees due to the fact that they’re 
essentially selling the fund management an option for which they get no premium? 
Furthermore, at the end of the day, investors are interested in the total cost of funds instead of 
individual cost components. Thus, I further study what is the estimated total cost of funds 
with performance fees compared to funds without performance fees. 
6.4.1. Comparison of fixed fees between fund types 
First, I test whether there’s a significant difference in the fixed fees (i.e. management, 
subscription and redemption fees) between funds with performance fees and those without.  
In summary, there are no indications that the subscription fees for funds with performance 
fees are lower than the subscription fees for funds without performance fees, based on a one-
sided t-test. However, the results indicate that redemption fees are indeed lower for funds with 
performance fees, based on a one-sided t-test. The mean redemption fee is 1.21% and 1.58% 
for funds with and without performance fees, respectively. This result is statistically 
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significant at a 0.1% level, which implies that funds with performance fees indeed give 
discounts from their redemption fees.17 
Interestingly, the same results also hold for management fees. The mean management fee is 
0.64% and 0.97% for funds with and without performance fees, respectively. The mean 33 
basis point difference is statistically significant at a 0.1% level. 
Results imply that funds with performance fees indeed charge lower management and 
redemption fees than funds without performance fees. No similar support is found for 
subscription fees, where there is no significant difference to either direction. Thus, the logical 
implication is that the performance fee component is simply not added on top of other fees; its 
existence has a negative impact on other fees. The results are detailed in in Table 13 below. 
Table 13: Differences in average fees of funds with performance fees and without 
The table summarizes the differences in different types of fees between funds with performance fees and 
without performance fees. The calculation is performed on average of subscription/management/redemption 
fee across the sample period for each fund (March 2007-December 2012) 
 
Funds with 
performance fees 
  
Funds without 
performance fees 
  
Test for difference in means 
 
n Mean 
  
n Mean 
  
DF Difference t-value 
Subscription fee 40 1.06 % 
  
292 0.96 % 
  
332 0.09 % -0.97 
Management fee 40 0.73 % 
  
292 0.95 % 
  
332 -0.22 % 2.78*** 
Redemption fee 40 1.32 %     292 1.56 %     332 -0.24 % 1.93* 
*), **) and ***) imply statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively 
 
Rather interestingly, it seems that funds with performance fees are indeed cheaper compared 
to funds without performance fees, at least judging by average management fee and 
redemption fee. The average management and redemption fees are 22 and 24 basis points 
lower for funds with performance fees compared to funds without such fees, respectively. The 
difference is statistically significant at 90% and 99% confidence levels for management and 
redemption fees, respectively. Subscription fees for funds with performance fees are higher, 
but the relationship is not significant. Thus, it seems that funds indeed give “discounts” from 
other fees, if they adopt a performance fee structure.  
                                                 
17Anecdotal evidence to this claim can be found for example from Nordea’s North America Fund, which markets 
the use of a performance fee as unique and explicitly states that if the benchmark is not beat, the fund holder 
pays lower fees. Thus, the use of performance fees can also be seen as a marketing tool to retail investors. 
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However, when taking into account the theoretical cost of the performance fee component, the 
total cost for funds with performance fees are higher. As evidenced by Figure 5 above, the 
cost associated with the performance fee is relatively large compared to the discount. 
Figure 5: Total cost of average fund with performance fee 
The graph below depicts the average discounts from management and redemption fees for funds with 
performance fees and the associated extra cost of performance fee. Units are basis points (0.01%). The figures 
are stated on an annual basis. 
 
Looking only at the annual costs and differences therein, funds with performance fees seem 
significantly more expensive. As the discount to the annual management fee for funds with 
performance fees is merely 22 basis points, and the extra cost associated with performance 
fees is on average 135 basis points, the total cost of annual ownership for funds with 
performance fees is, on average, considerably higher.18  In fact, out of the 40 funds charging 
performance fees in my sample, only two have performance fees with values lower than the 
22 basis points. Even in these two cases, the low value is caused by a very high value for the 
high-water mark. 
                                                 
18
 As a caveat, this approach disregards the discounts/extra costs associated with redemption and subscription 
fees, which are charged only once. If the one-off redemption and subscription fees are taken into account, the 
discount from fixed fees would be larger for funds with performance fees.  
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7. Discussion of results 
In this part, I link the results of my analysis in part 6 to the theoretical literature in part 2 and 
my research questions. I provide a brief overview of my results and discuss their implications 
both to the academic literature as well as to the investing public. Table 14 provides a high-
level summary of my research questions and empirical findings. 
Table 14: Summary of empirical findings 
Original research question Empirical findings 
1. What is the impact of 
performance fees on risk-adjusted 
mutual fund returns in Finland? 
The introduction of performance fees increases funds' risk-adjusted 
returns. The impact on a fund's quarterly four-factor alpha is 74-84 basis 
points. The impact on a fund's annual Sharpe ratio (excess return over 
risk-free rate per percentage point of volatility) is 0.19. The results are 
highly significant at a 99% confidence level. However, the intrinsic 
characteristics of performance fees do not have a significant impact on 
risk-adjusted returns. 
2. What is the ex ante value of the 
performance fees? 
On average, the theoretical value of the performance fee is 135 basis 
points within the 40 Finnish mutual funds that charge or that have 
charged a performance fee in the past. The values range from 1 basis 
point to 484 basis points. 
3. Do Finnish funds with 
performance fees charge lower 
expenses compared to funds 
without performance fees? 
Funds with performance fees charge, on average, 22 and 24 basis point 
lower management and redemption fees p.a., respectively. The results are 
highly significant at a 99% confidence level. No similar discount exists 
for subscription fees. However, when taking the calculated ex ante value 
of the performance fees into account, funds with performance fees are 
actually more expensive than funds without such fees.  
4. Do funds with performance fees 
on average exhibit more risk in 
terms of volatility, when adjusted 
for differences in investment 
styles? 
The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of a contractual 
performance fee is not associated with higher absolute risk levels as 
measured by a fund's volatility, when controlling for time and style 
effects.  
5. Do funds with performance fees 
exhibit on average higher tracking 
errors? 
Funds with performance fees exhibit on average 409 basis points higher 
tracking errors (standard deviation of the difference in returns of the fund 
and the benchmark), implying higher deviations from the benchmark for 
funds with performance fees. 
Contrasting my empirical results to the hypotheses section, empirical support is found to my 
first hypothesis that performance fees are associated with improved performance. The 
observed relationship is consistently positive and significant across different model 
specifications. 
With respect to my hypotheses related to the relationship between risk and performance fees, 
the empirical results are twofold. Firstly, the empirical results do not provide support that 
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performance fees are associated with higher absolute volatilities. Thus, performance fees do 
not seem to induce absolute risk-taking. However, the empirical observations do provide 
support to my second risk-related hypothesis that the use of performance fees is associated 
with higher tracking errors. Thus, performance fees do seem to be associated with higher 
active risk-taking (i.e. deviations from the benchmark) 
7.1. Regulatory implications 
Regulators in some countries (e.g. United States, Norway, and Germany) have expressed their 
concerns that performance fees lead to higher risk-taking without additional benefit to 
investors. Norway and the U.S. have, partly based on these fears, banned performance fees 
from funds available to retail investors or require the use of fulcrum (symmetric) fees. The 
empirical support to the regulators’ fear is mixed. Funds with performance fees seem to offer 
higher after-fee returns to their investors without increases in absolute risk levels. However, 
the use of performance fees seems to be associated with higher active risk-taking and larger 
tracking errors. 
From a regulatory perspective, my results indicate that banning funds with performance fees 
altogether from retail investors is an excessively strict approach. The regulatory approach in 
the United States and Norway, albeit based on sound logic and reasonable fears of distorted 
incentives, seems to be excessively strict, when compared with empirical results from my 
study as well as existing research.  
However, for regulators and securities exchanges, additional focus on the adequate disclosure 
of performance fees is required, as the current practices are not, in my view, sufficient for 
investors to form a holistic picture of the true costs of the fees. Based on my evaluation of the 
disclosure of performance fees under the IOSCO recommendations, further granularity in 
fund KIIDs and rules is required. More specifically, the regulator should focus that fund 
companies provide sufficient detail in the calculation methodology of the performance fees. 
Currently, it is fairly difficult or even impossible to understand whether the performance fee 
is charged on gross or net return for most funds. Furthermore, to ensure understandable 
disclosure of the actual cost of the performance fees, concrete examples would be needed in 
the fund prospectuses on the calculation of the performance fee under different scenarios.  
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One potential area of development would be to disclose a theoretical value for the 
performance fee to enable investors to evaluate the actual cost of such funds. Naturally, such 
an approach would require substantial assumptions about valuation methodology. 
7.2. Economic implications 
From an investors’ perspective, mutual funds with performance fees seem like an attractive 
choice for investment. In light of my results, funds with performance fees are able to offer 
better risk-adjusted returns regardless of the risk-adjustment used. The funds do not take 
additional risk as measured in terms of volatility, but they do deviate more from their 
benchmarks than conventional funds. 
However, funds with performance fees are not a homogenous group of investments. The 
contractual variation in the fee structures is substantial and some of the fee structures, prima 
facie, do not seem to align the fund managements’ incentives with those of the investors. An 
example of this would be the use of a 12-month euribor rate as the hurdle rate or not having a 
hurdle rate at all. Luckily, from the investors’ perspective, funds with questionable 
benchmark rates have high-water mark provisions in force, protecting the investors’ interests. 
With respect to the discussion on principal-agent conflicts, my results, on aggregate, support 
the claim that an increase in incentives better aligns the interests of the principal and the 
agent. The performance fee, which can clearly be seen as a direct incentivization mechanism, 
is associated with superior performance compared to funds without such mechanisms.  
Economically, one curious question related to performance fees is their relative rareness. Only 
12% of Finnish mutual funds utilize such fee structures, even though their advantages both 
from an investors’ and the fund company’s point of view are clear. The structure at least 
partially reduces the conflicts of interest and seems to give an explicit incentive to the fund 
management.  
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8. Conclusions 
The goal of my research is to provide insight into the relationship between the use of 
performance fees and mutual funds’ risk and return profiles. Utilizing a dataset of 332 Finnish 
mutual funds with quarterly observations, of which 40 utilize performance fees, I conduct a 
variety of empirical analyses testing the impact of the use of performance fees on risk and 
return. Furthermore, utilizing simulation-based methods and the Margrabe model, I calculate 
a theoretical value for the cost of these fee structures. 
My empirical results provide support to the hypothesis that higher managerial incentives are 
associated with superior performance in Finnish mutual funds. The impact is significantly 
positive across three different return measures (raw quarterly net return, four-factor alpha and 
Sharpe ratio). For the raw quarterly net return, performance fees are associated with an 
increase of 90 basis points, when controlling for time and style impact with dummy variables. 
With the four-factor alpha, the impact with the same control variables is 79.5 basis points per 
quarter. For the Sharpe ratio, which measures excess return per unit of volatility, the impact is 
13.3 basis points of excess return per unit of volatility, when controlling for time and style 
factors. This result is however not significant. When controlling only for time factors, the 
impact is 16.9 basis points and significant. On an annual basis, this translates into an 
outperformance of 2.94%-3.74% assuming average volatility. The observed positive 
relationship is in line with the research of Massa and Patgiri (2009) who find that higher 
managerial incentives lead to higher risk-adjusted returns, albeit using a different measure of 
incentives. My results also support the findings of Elton et al. (2003) who observe that risk-
adjusted performance is higher for funds with performance fees. 
With regards to the risk-inducing features of performance fees, the results are intriguing. 
Performance fees do not have a significant impact on the funds’ volatilities, when controlling 
for time and/or investment focus differences. Thus, on aggregate, my results do not support 
the hypothesis that performance fee compensation leads to higher risk-taking. These results is 
in contrast with the theoretical literature (see e.g. Carpenter, 2000) arguing that option 
compensation may lead to higher risk-taking. My empirical observations are potentially 
explained by the fact that majority of the funds in my sample have provisions such as high-
water marks and positivity constraints protecting the investors’ interests and acting as a 
deterrent against excess risk-taking. 
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However, with regards to active risk-taking as defined by deviations from the benchmark, the 
results are significant. Funds with performance fees, on average, exhibit higher tracking errors 
compared to funds without such fee provisions. The results provide support to the hypothesis 
that performance fees are associated with higher deviations from the benchmark, as argued by 
Elton et al. (2003).  
Economically, performance fees pose a significant cost to the investor. The average 
theoretical value of a performance fee as of the beginning of 2013, based on simulations, is 
135 basis points per annum, with the median being 116 basis points. The results are however 
highly sensitive to the assumed correlation between the fund and the benchmark as well as to 
the magnitude of high-water-mark at the beginning of the period. The use of performance fees 
is also associated with discounts from other, fixed fees of the funds. On average, the 
management and redemption fees are 22 and 24 basis points lower for funds with 
performance fees, respectively. Notably, this result is highly significant. No similar 
significant discount is observable for subscription fees. 
At the end of the day, however, funds with performance fees are, on average, more expensive 
to the retail investor. The mean value of the performance fee of 135 basis points is 
considerably higher than the combined discount of 70 basis points from management and 
redemption fees, implicitly assuming a one-year holding period for the investor. If the holding 
period is assumed to be longer, the economic significance of the discount from the 
redemption fee diminishes. Consequently, the cost difference between funds with 
performance fees and without such fees increases. 
However, despite the higher costs associated with performance fee structures, the funds pose 
an attractive investment opportunity for the average investor, as they offer both superior risk-
adjusted returns as well as raw returns. Thus, the additional costs associated with these funds 
are at least partly justifiable on merits of investment track record and in this case, more 
expensive funds are indeed better. 
The regulatory approaches with regards to performance fees vary notably even within the 
European Union. Germany’s BaFin has provided detailed model terms that funds must follow, 
whereas Finland and Sweden are focusing more on adherence to common principles and 
adequate disclosure. In Finnish funds with performance fees, the disclosure of the fees is, on 
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aggregate, not compliant with the IOSCO recommendations. Funds do not provide concrete 
calculation examples and the calculation periods are often shorter than the recommended year.  
My research primarily focuses on the impact of performance fees on return and risk and 
attempts to quantify the value of the performance fees at a single point of time to illustrate the 
actual cost of such fee structures to investors. However, the field of managerial incentives and 
performance fees provide a plethora of interesting topics of future research. One potential 
interesting area for future research would be to examine whether Scandinavian mutual funds 
with performance fees exhibit risk-shifting behaviour, as has been observed in other countries. 
Namely, an interesting question would be whether mid-year losers increase their subsequent 
tracking errors compared to mid-year winners in the hopes of “putting everything on black” 
and getting back in the money on their performance fee options. 
Furthermore, a descriptive study on the use of performance fees across Europe would be 
rather fascinating given the rather different regulatory approaches with regards to 
performance fees and their potential impact on the use of the fees. Based on my experiences 
of contacting regulators and trade associations, the regulation of performance fees is not well-
known and shedding light on the differences across European countries would be rather 
interesting. When it comes to the valuation of performance fees, conducting a more 
comprehensive valuation with more sophisticated methodology using a pan-European sample 
would yield interesting insights into geographical variation of the fees.  
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APPENDIX A. Compliance of Finnish funds with IOSCO 
recommendations  
This table presents an empirical summary on the compliance of Finnish mutual funds with performance fees 
with the IOSCO recommendations as stipulated in the Final Report On Elements Of International Regulatory 
Standards On Fees And Expenses Of Investment Funds. Compliance is evaluated on the following criteria: 
Payment frequency (At least one year is considered a reasonable period); After other fees (Excess performance 
should be assessed after deduction of all costs borne by the fund); Same benchmark (The same benchmark 
should be used for assessing performance and calculating performance fees); Concrete examples (Achieving 
adequate informing of investors of the existence and impact of performance fees can be achieved by giving 
concrete examples on calculation of the performance fee) 
 
Adherence to these recommendations is determined by comparing the disclosure in the KIID and the fund rules 
to the aforementioned criteria. The KIIDs and fund rules used are those available on fund company websites as 
of July 2013. For obsolete funds, the used prospectuses are the ones in force prior to obsolete data. The 
compliance is evaluated by three answers: Yes denotes that the fund is in compliance with the criteria; No 
denotes that the fund's disclosed methodology is clearly in conflict with the IOSCO recommendations; NA 
denotes that there is insufficient disclosure in the fund prospectus or rules to evaluate adherence to the criteria. 
NM refers to cases, where evaluation on the criteria is not meaningful 
Fund Payment frequency Same benchmark 
After other 
fees 
Concrete 
examples 
Aktia High Conviction No Yes No2) No 
Arvo Finland Value Yes Yes No2) No 
Bon Kehittyvät Markkinat No3) NA No2) No3) 
Danske Invest Pohjoisen Parhaat Yes Yes No2) No 
EPL Osakeoptimi A1 No Yes No2) No3) 
EPL Value A1 No Yes No2) No3) 
eQ Global Focus 2 K No Yes No2) No 
eQ Pikkujättiläiset 2 K No No No2) No 
Eufex ActiveAlpha No Yes No2) No 
Fourton Fokus Suomi No Yes No2) No 
Fourton Hannibal No No4) No2) No 
Fourton Odysseus No No4) No2) No 
Fourton Stamina No No4) No2) No 
ICECAPITAL Frontier Markets B Yes Yes No2) No 
JOM Silkkitie Asia Special Mutual Yes5) No4) No2) No 
Nordea Pohjois-Amerikka K NA Yes No2) No 
Nordea Suomi 130/30 K Yes5) Yes No2) No 
OP-Focus A Yes5) Yes No2) No 
Pyn Elite A No No4) Yes No 
Pyn Populus No No4) Yes No 
Quorum Nordic Special Situations NA Yes Yes No 
Seligson & Co Phoebus Yes No6) NA No 
Seligson & Co Phoenix Yes No6) NA No 
Seligson & Co Russian Prosperity Yes No6) NA No 
Taaleritehdas Arvo Markka Osake Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Arvo Rein Osake Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Em Europe Infrast  Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Emerg Europe Val Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Hansa Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Lyydian Leijona Osake Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Maailma Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Rupla Osake Yes Yes NA No 
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Taaleritehdas Tenge Equity Yes Yes No Yes 
Taaleritehdas Troikka Osake Yes Yes NA No 
Taaleritehdas Zloty Osake Yes Yes No Yes 
UB Aasia REIT Plus Kasvu No No4) NA No 
UB Nordic Yes No4) NA No 
UB Real REIT No No4) NA No 
WIP Hakkapeliitat Yes No4) NA No 
VISIO Finland 140/40  NA NA NA NA 
Notes: 
    
1) High-water mark/positivity constraint in force, thus evaluation under criteria not applicable 
2) Disclosure ambiguous 
3) Latest rules not available, evaluation done by KIID only 
4) No benchmark index/Performance fee charged on a fixed rate/euribor 
5) Performance fee charged on a less-than-year basis (daily/monthly/quarterly) based on rolling 12-month return 
6) Performance fee charged based on geometric average returns 
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APPENDIX B. Overview of funds in the sample utilizing 
performance fees 
Name Size 
M€ 
Inception 
Date 
Obsolete 
Date 
ISIN Categorization 
Aktia High Conviction B 6.5 29.2.2012 FI4000037916 Europe 
Arvo Finland Value Kasvu 20.1 18.10.2005 FI0008809876 Europe 
Bon Kehittyvät Markkinat A1 6.3 28.12.2010 FI4000019781 Global 
Danske Invest Pohjoisen Parhaat K 44.6 9.2.2006 FI0008810312 Europe 
EPL Osakeoptimi A1 60.5 19.1.2011 FI4000019708 Global 
EPL Value A1 28.6 14.3.2012 FI4000041355 Global 
eQ Global Focus 2 K 1.12.1999 22.11.2011 FI0008804695 Global 
eQ Pikkujättiläiset 2 K 26.3 30.9.1999 FI0008804687 Europe 
Eufex ActiveAlpha 6.8 30.11.2009 FI4000007281 Global 
Fourton Fokus Suomi 11.7 4.9.2009 FI4000004585 Europe 
Fourton Hannibal 17.5 31.3.2007 FI0008811971 Europe 
Fourton Odysseus 213.3 5.3.2004 FI0008807227 Europe 
Fourton Stamina 241.8 5.3.2004 FI0008807235 Europe 
ICECAPITAL Frontier Markets B 19.12.2011 FI4000035845 Global 
JOM Silkkitie Asia Special Mutual 25.1 31.7.2009 FI4000003470 APAC 
Nordea Pohjois-Amerikka K 517.9 11.2.2002 FI0008805585 NorthAm. 
Nordea Suomi 130/30 K 19.3 15.4.2008 FI0008813050 Europe 
OP-Focus A 330.0 28.1.2002 FI0008805429 Europe 
Pyn Elite A 83.0 1.2.1999 FI0008803812 APAC 
Pyn Populus 90.2 31.8.2006 FI0008810957 APAC 
Quorum Nordic Special Situations 30.10.2008 FI0008813647 Europe 
Seligson & Co Phoebus A 22.8 10.10.2001 FI0008805486 Global 
Seligson & Co Phoenix A 10.4 25.9.2000 FI0008802277 Global 
Seligson & Co Russian Prosperity Euro A 183.5 8.3.2000 FI0008802004 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Arvo Markka Osake A 95.6 26.5.2010 FI4000013172 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Arvo Rein Osake A 39.3 9.9.2011 FI4000023999 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Em Europe Infrast Eq A Acc 13.3.2008 13.2.2009 FI0008812920 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Emerg Europe Val Eq A Acc 13.3.2008 13.2.2009 FI0008812961 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Hansa A Acc 11.10.2007 9.2.2009 FI0008812235 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Lyydian Leijona Osake A 65.6 13.3.2008 FI0008812904 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Maailma A Acc 11.10.2007 1.10.2008 FI0008812250 Global 
Taaleritehdas Rupla Osake A 26.3 7.5.2008 FI0008812888 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Tenge Equity A Acc 13.3.2008 11.2.2009 FI0008812946 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Troikka Osake A 14.4 13.2.2009 FI0008814231 Europe 
Taaleritehdas Zloty Osake A 13.3.2008 18.11.2011 FI0008812862 Europe 
UB Aasia REIT Plus Kasvu 18.0 9.2.2007 FI0008811773 APAC 
UB Nordic 7.7 11.12.2006 FI0008811484 Europe 
UB Real REIT 12.6.2012 FI4000044045 Global 
WIP Hakkapeliitat 15.9 1.9.2010 FI4000016753 Europe 
VISIO Finland 140/40 Fund (non-UCITS) 2.7 15.4.2010 31.8.2012 FI4000013149 Europe 
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APPENDIX C. Overview of quarterly returns of explanatory 
portfolios 
Table 15: Quarterly returns of the explanatory portfolios 03/2007-12/2012 
Name N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
APAC Market return 24 2.25 % 14.97 % -27.01 % 37.03 % 
APAC SMB return 24 -0.99 % 5.91 % -11.92 % 12.70 % 
APAC HML return 24 0.88 % 3.98 % -7.75 % 8.31 % 
APAC WML return 24 0.37 % 8.53 % -30.28 % 16.03 % 
APAC risk-free rate 24 0.23 % 0.38 % 0.00 % 1.26 % 
Europe Market return 24 0.13 % 13.33 % -23.32 % 26.04 % 
Europe SMB return 24 -0.55 % 3.74 % -6.89 % 6.55 % 
Europe HML return 24 -0.87 % 4.63 % -9.25 % 12.54 % 
Europe WML return 24 1.91 % 9.27 % -29.97 % 15.01 % 
Europe risk-free rate 24 0.23 % 0.38 % 0.00 % 1.26 % 
Global Market return 24 0.51 % 11.10 % -21.53 % 22.12 % 
Global SMB return 24 -0.13 % 2.56 % -5.25 % 5.99 % 
Global HML return 24 -0.27 % 3.78 % -8.29 % 9.55 % 
Global WML return 24 0.51 % 8.43 % -29.86 % 11.95 % 
Global risk-free rate 24 0.23 % 0.38 % 0.00 % 1.26 % 
Japan Market return 24 -0.90 % 8.69 % -17.09 % 23.14 % 
Japan SMB return 24 0.67 % 3.85 % -6.89 % 9.08 % 
Japan HML return 24 0.87 % 3.59 % -5.47 % 8.44 % 
Japan WML return 24 -0.05 % 8.95 % -26.11 % 16.12 % 
Japan risk-free rate 24 0.23 % 0.38 % 0.00 % 1.26 % 
North America Market return 24 1.02 % 10.52 % -23.58 % 17.54 % 
North America SMB return 24 0.39 % 3.18 % -7.75 % 6.25 % 
North America HML return 24 -0.50 % 5.08 % -11.38 % 12.52 % 
North America WML return 24 -0.22 % 9.40 % -30.08 % 16.56 % 
North America risk-free rate 24 0.23 % 0.38 % 0.00 % 1.26 % 
This table summarizes the returns of the explanatory portfolios utilized in determining the four-factor alpha. 
Market return is in excess of the risk-free rate. SMB refers to a size factor portfolio, HML refers to a value 
factor portfolio and WML refers to a momentum factor portfolio. The returns are three-month discrete 
returns. The returns have been acquired from Kenneth French's website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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APPENDIX D. Summary statistics on the subsample for tracking 
error calculations 
This table provides an overview on the sample utilized for tracking error calculations and its differences with 
the overall sample. Overall I was able to obtain benchmark data for 248 funds in the sample, consequently 
dropping 84 funds of the original sample. The below table provides the mean values across time for each of the 
funds in sample tabulated based on whether benchmark data is available or not. The standard deviation of each 
statistic is in parentheses. 
  
No benchmark data available Benchmark data available Total sample 
  
AUM (€m) 42.14 78.86 70.79 
(54.90) (97.27) (90.89) 
Fund age 5.759 7.238 6.913 
(3.977) (4.742) (4.620) 
Volatility  20.17 21.82 21.46 
(4.795) (4.819) (4.854) 
Unitholders 2445.3 6296.4 5450.7 
(5321.5) (12342.8) (11290.3) 
Observations 94 238 332 
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APPENDIX E. Sensitivity analysis 
Table 16: Sensitivity analysis of performance fees 
The table below depicts the sensitivity of the simulated ex ante value of the performance fee to changes in key 
parameters: correlation with the benchmark and the volatility of the fund. The figures have been calculated 
with 10000 simulations, assuming annual frequency, risk-free rate of 1.95% and a benchmark volatility of 20% 
under various scenarios. In panel A, the hypothetical performance fee has no contractual limitations. In panel 
B, the performance fee is charged only for positive absolute performance. In panel C, the fund needs to beat a 
high-water mark, which is set at 120% of the beginning fund value at the start of the period. 
Panel A: Sensitivity analysis of a plain vanilla performance fee 
Fund standard deviation 
  15 % 17 % 19 % 21 % 23 % 25 % 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
 
co
ef
fic
ie
n
t 
0.4 1.50 % 1.61 % 1.70 % 1.85 % 2.00 % 2.14 % 
0.5 1.37 % 1.45 % 1.56 % 1.69 % 1.83 % 1.97 % 
0.6 1.23 % 1.30 % 1.39 % 1.51 % 1.64 % 1.81 % 
0.7 1.07 % 1.13 % 1.22 % 1.31 % 1.42 % 1.59 % 
0.8 0.88 % 0.91 % 0.98 % 1.08 % 1.20 % 1.33 % 
0.9 0.67 % 0.68 % 0.69 % 0.78 % 0.89 % 1.03 % 
Panel B: Plain vanilla with positivity constraint 
Fund standard deviation 
  15 % 17 % 19 % 21 % 23 % 25 % 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
 
co
ef
fic
ie
n
t 
0.4 1.14 % 1.29 % 1.43 % 1.59 % 1.78 % 1.95 % 
0.5 0.99 % 1.14 % 1.25 % 1.40 % 1.59 % 1.76 % 
0.6 0.86 % 0.98 % 1.09 % 1.23 % 1.39 % 1.59 % 
0.7 0.69 % 0.80 % 0.91 % 1.06 % 1.22 % 1.39 % 
0.8 0.50 % 0.60 % 0.71 % 0.85 % 1.00 % 1.16 % 
0.9 0.29 % 0.37 % 0.46 % 0.60 % 0.74 % 0.91 % 
Panel C: High-water mark at 120% of beginning value 
Fund standard deviation 
  15 % 17 % 19 % 21 % 23 % 25 % 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
 
co
ef
fic
ie
n
t 
0.4 0.18 % 0.27 % 0.38 % 0.52 % 0.65 % 0.82 % 
0.5 0.16 % 0.24 % 0.36 % 0.47 % 0.63 % 0.77 % 
0.6 0.13 % 0.22 % 0.31 % 0.44 % 0.57 % 0.74 % 
0.7 0.10 % 0.18 % 0.27 % 0.40 % 0.54 % 0.68 % 
0.8 0.07 % 0.13 % 0.22 % 0.33 % 0.46 % 0.61 % 
0.9 0.03 % 0.07 % 0.15 % 0.24 % 0.38 % 0.53 % 
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APPENDIX F. Individual results of the valuation 
Table 17: Individual valuation results and key assumptions 
This table describes the results of the individual valuation for each of the funds in the sample along with key 
assumptions. Key assumptions are related to the magnitude of the high-water-marks (HWMs), which are at 
times not available. The values listed below are calculated based on real high-water-marks as of the beginning 
of 2013, if available. If the HWM is not available, I've assumed that the HWM is set at the beginning value of 
the fund and that the HWM is re-evaluated each time the performance fee is charge (i.e., if the performance fee 
is charged on a monthly basis, the HWM is updated on a monthly basis at the same date and so on) 
Fund Value Remarks on valuation 
Aktia High 
Conviction B 0.49 % 
HWM stated in the prospectuses determined individually for each investor. 
Thus, obtaining a universal HWM for fund impossible. Assumed that the 
HWM is set at the beginning value of the fund (100) and that it's increasing 
at each end of the month. 
Arvo Finland 
Value Kasvu 0.51 % No deviating assumptions 
Bon Kehittyvät 
Markkinat A1 1.16 % 
Assumed a 252-day trading year instead of 360. Consequently utilized a 63-
day calculation period instead of the 90-day calculation period.  
Danske Invest 
Pohjoisen 
Parhaat K 
0.29 % Simple, calculated based on yearly return assuming single calculation date; high correlation, positivity constraint and similar volatilities driving value 
EPL 
Osakeoptimi A1 2.77 % 
Assumed a 252-day trading year instead of 360. Consequently utilized a 63-
day calculation period instead of the 90-day calculation period. Furthermore 
used the rules-stated maximum participation rate of 30%. Low correlation of 
0.63 driving option value. Furthermore, high option value driven by lack of 
constraints (HWM/positivity constraint) 
EPL Value A1 4.84 % 
Assumed a 252-day trading year instead of 360. Consequently utilized a 63-
day calculation period instead of the 90-day calculation period. Furthermore 
used the rules-stated maximum participation rate of 30%. Very low 
correlation of 0.08 and large difference in volatilities driving option value. 
Furthermore, no constraints (e.g. HWMs or positivity), driving option value. 
With a correlation of 0.7, value would be 3.8%.  
eQ Global Focus 
2 K 1.35 % 
Charged on a daily basis; high-water mark in force. Due to lack of data, 
HWM assumed to be 100 (fund obsolete) 
eQ 
Pikkujättiläiset 2 
K 
2.74 % 
Historical HWM at YE12 calculated to be 109.17 based on fund price 
history. Calculation period assumed to be monthly (no disclosure in rules). 
Fund utilizing a fixed hurdle rate – no benchmark volatility. If HWM set at 
100, value of fee at 3.60% 
Eufex 
ActiveAlpha 1.94 % 
Fund using a benchmark consisting of arithmetic average returns of four 
different benchmark indices. Benchmark manually generated from 
Bloomberg data. Due to lack of overall fund price history, HWM set at 
beginning value of the calculation period (100); Also assumed max 
participation rate of 30% used. HWM increasing on a daily basis 
Fourton Fokus 
Suomi 0.02 % 
HWM set at 145, resulting in a very low ex ante value for the fee. 
Calculation on a monthly basis. Monthly calculation basis. If HWM set at 
100, value for fee is 0.46% 
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Fourton 
Hannibal 0.27 % 
Benchmark return 12-month euribor with HWM in force. Assumed constant 
euribor rate; HWM growing along with euribor. HWM set at 131, driving 
low option value. If HWM at 100, option value 1.948% 
Fourton 
Odysseus 0.93 % 
Benchmark set at 114; monthly calculation period with HWM growing at 
euribor rate; if HWM set at 100, value of perf fee 1.91% 
Fourton Stamina 0.01 % 
HWM from fund history, made relative to value at the beginning of the 
calculation period; value with HWM at 100 is 1.347%. 12-month euribor as 
ref rate 
ICECAPITAL 
Frontier Markets 
B 
1.71 % Yearly calculation period, low correlation with benchmark driving option 
value 
JOM Silkkitie 
Asia Special 
Mutual 
1.66 % 
Special case; utilized monthly calculation period. Fixed hurdle rate and 
HWM. HWM set at 100, as fund at its historical highest value as of the 
beginning of the calculation period 
Nordea Pohjois-
Amerikka K 0.60 % 
Disclosure ambiguous with regards to calculation period. Cap on fee limiting 
upside, thus value of fee is effectively size of cap 
Nordea Suomi 
130-30 K 1.20 % 
Performance fee charged on a daily basis on a rolling one-year return. Thus, 
simulated two years of returns and calculated the payoffs during the second 
year. Positivity constraint in force 
OP-Focus A 0.47 % 
Performance fee charged on a daily basis on a rolling one-year return. Thus, 
simulated two years of returns and calculated the payoffs during the second 
year. Positivity constraint in force. High correlation and similar volatilities 
driving value downwards vs. Nordea where fund volatility significantly 
higher than benchmark's 
Pyn Elite A 3.28 % Interestingly charged only on pure quarterly return. HWMs in force only for high net-worth subscribers. 
Pyn Populus 1.32 % Contrary to Elite, HWM in force for all subscribers. HWM assumed to be at 116. If HWM set at 100, option value about 2.11% 
Quorum Nordic 
Special 
Situations 
0.48 % HWM set at 138. 
Seligson & Co 
Phoebus A 0.49 % 
Interesting geometric mean structure for determining payoff; simulated 3 
years of returns and calculated the payoff based on them as of the beginning 
of year 3 
Seligson & Co 
Phoenix A 0.81 % 
Interesting geometric mean structure for determining payoff; simulated 3 
years of returns and calculated the payoff based on them as of the beginning 
of year 3 
Seligson & Co 
Russian 
Prosperity Euro 
A 
1.15 % Maximum payoff capped to 3% of average NAV, which is calculated based 
on average daily values. 
Taaleritehdas 
Arvo Markka 
Osake A 
0.52 % Yearly calculation period, basic case 
Taaleritehdas 
Arvo Rein Osake 
A 
1.01 % Simple yearly calculation period 
Taaleritehdas 
Em Europe 
Infrast Eq A Acc 
2.83 % Simple yearly calculation period; value driven by low correlation 
  81 
Taaleritehdas 
Emerg Europe 
Val Eq A Acc 
1.92 % Simple yearly calculation period 
Taaleritehdas 
Hansa A Acc 1.17 % Simple yearly calculation period 
Taaleritehdas 
Lyydian Leijona 
Osake A 
1.15 % Simple yearly calculation period 
Taaleritehdas 
Maailma A Acc 0.75 % Simple yearly calculation period, value lower due to higher correlation 
Taaleritehdas 
Rupla Osake A 1.31 % 
Simple yearly calculation period, value high due to high standard deviation 
of returns 
Taaleritehdas 
Tenge Equity A 
Acc 
2.66 % Low correlation, high fund standard deviation driving option value op. 
Taaleritehdas 
Troikka Osake A 1.73 % High difference in volatilities between benchmark and fund 
Taaleritehdas 
Zloty Osake A 1.20 %   
UB Aasia REIT 
Plus Kasvu 2.63 % Initial HWM assumed to be 100, growing with daily increases in fund value 
UB Nordic 1.96 % Initial HWM assumed to be 100, growing with daily increases in fund value. Constant 12-month euribor of 0.54% assumed 
UB Real REIT 0.49 % Initial HWM assumed to be 100, growing with daily increases in fund value. 
WIP 
Hakkapeliitat 1.10 % 
Initial HWM assumed to be 100 due to lack of data; two years of simulation 
(assumed daily frequency) 
VISIO Finland 
140-40 Fund  0.94 % Fairly simple, monthly set 
 
